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Abstract
3
Strategic interaction has traditionally been modelled in economics with game theoretic 
equilibrium models. In these models, strategies constitute best responses to beliefs 
that are consistent with other players’ strategies. While this consistency is realistic in 
settings familiar to the players, it is less appropriate in situations that are encountered 
for the first time. This shortcoming has led to the conception of models of bounded 
rationality, in particular the level-A: model of levels of reasoning.
While experimental studies usually employ only action data to test the level-A; 
model, in this thesis, a team setup with electronic communication between participants 
allows for a qualitatively richer insight in actual reasoning processes.
Two different games are played to investigate different notions of strategic thinking. 
The first study uses a dominance-solvable ‘beauty contest’ game in which 6-8 teams 
compete for a prize. This game lends itself naturally to the observation of levels of 
reasoning. In addition, the communication allows to analyse the anchoring level-0 
belief and the population belief of individual players.
The second study uses a zero-sum ‘hide and seek’ game that two teams play against 
each other. Both the influence of non-neutral framing on the level-0 belief and the 
task-dependence of the level of reasoning can be brought to light in this study.
The third and final chapter considers an application of the equilibrium concept 
in the theory of implicit incentives, a situation of complex strategic interaction. The 
method and results of the study are viewed against the background of the limitations 
of equilibrium models to reflect a situation of inherent one-shot nature.
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Many strategic decisions are taken by economic agents after only a short history of 
similar situations or without such history at all. In trying to understand and predict 
behavior in these situations, equilibrium concepts used in economics often turn out to 
be of limited use. In equilibrium models the players find their strategy by optimally 
responding to their belief about the strategies of the other players -  and these beliefs 
are thought to be consistent with the other players’ strategies. This is well suited 
to characterise behaviour in settings familiar to the player. However, in strategic 
situations with a short or no history of play there is little reason to think that the 
players’ beliefs and the opponents’ strategies ought to be consistent.
Alternative models of bounded rationality have been proposed for economic appli­
cations that are closer to one-shot games than repeated games. The model of levels of 
reasoning features prominently in this area, because it precisely relaxes the assump­
tion of mutually consistent beliefs, but retains the idea of strategic behaviour with 
optimal responses. Applications include the ‘beauty contest’ game (Nagel, 1995), 
normal-form games (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta, 
2001), two-person zero-sum games with non-neutral framing (Crawford and Iriberri, 
2007a), common-value auctions (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007b), and coordination 
games (Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich, 2008). Related structures have been 
introduced in the area of social learning (Eyster and Rabin, 2008).
The main idea of the level-A: model is to impose a certain structure on the players’ 
beliefs about the other players’ strategies, and to allow for heterogeneity among the 
players in this respect: Some players, so-called ‘level-0 reasoners’, do not best respond 
to any belief. This is modeled as playing randomly according to some distribution 
(‘level-0 distribution’) over the action space. Other players, ‘level-1 reasoners’, recog­
nise this behaviour, form the belief that all other players are level-0-reasoners and 
best-respond to this belief. A third type of players, ‘level-2 reasoners’, believe to be 
playing against both level-0 and level-1 reasoners, form a belief about their propor­
tions in the population (‘population belief’) and best respond to this belief. Similarly, 
‘level-3 reasoners’ believe to be playing against level-0, level-1 and level-2 reasoners 
and so on. Every agent believes that others are on a strictly lower level. Hence, the 
population belief for level-0 and level-1 is trivial. For players of level-2 and higher, 
different forms of population beliefs can be conceived. A degenerate population belief, 
as for example assumed in the model by Nagel (1995), is one where all other players 
are believed to be exactly one level of reasoning below oneself.
Various versions of the level-A: model have been introduced, with differing assump­
tions about the population beliefs, the precision of best responses, the sophistication 
of players and the presence of types with dominance reasoning. Generally, they were 
shown to explain reasonably well the action data from experimental one-shot games. 
However, this explanatory power of the level-A; model is not surprising: Once the con­
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sistency of beliefs assumption is relaxed, the model features more degrees of freedom. 
The action is thought to be the outcome of a more or less involved reasoning process, 
which depends on the player’s own level of reasoning, the belief about how far other 
players reason and the belief about the level-0 play. In fact, the model is able to ex­
plain any experimental action data if one just chooses appropriately the level-0 action 
distribution, the level-0 belief and/or level-/c population distribution. The flip-side of 
this are two major short-comings: Firstly, any test of the model which is based only 
on action data will have little or no power. Secondly, and most importantly, unless 
all the model’s parameters are pinned down, it has little predictive value -  which is 
what one is ultimately interested in.
For a variety of applications, different level-0 beliefs have been proposed in the 
literature to incorporate specific factors of the situation under consideration. The 
initial models of Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995) did not impose particu­
lar distributions but assumed a uniform random level-0 belief. Bacharach and Stahl 
(2000) propose a level-0 belief that captures the salience of options which is not re­
flected in the payoffs, but only in the labelling. Crawford (2003) considers a certain 
attraction of level-0 players to truthful statements in strategic communication. So far, 
a clear definition as to what kind of considerations can enter the level-0 has not yet 
developed. To which extent the proposed level-0 beliefs reflect the naturally occurring 
level-0 beliefs is the subject of the first two chapters of this thesis.
Since data about choices made is on its own not sufficient to estimate the param­
eters of a general level-A; model, further efforts have been made to test the theory’s 
assumptions by considering information search patterns and relating them to types of 
players (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006) or by eliciting 
beliefs (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker, 2008).
The first chapter, which draws on joint work with Konrad B. Burchardi, proposes 
an experimental design that allows to closely observe the reasoning process in situa­
tions of one-shot games by making use of intra-team communication. In particular, 
the games are played in teams of two players with one simultaneously exchanged mes­
sage and a suggested decision. After reading the team partner’s message both players 
make their final decision independently, one of which is then chosen randomly to be 
the team’s action. Importantly, this design provides strong incentives for the players 
to communicate their reasoning fully because the message is the only opportunity to 
convince the partner of one’s reasoning. Furthermore, due to the simultaneity in the 
exchange of the message, any influence that the team partners might have on each 
others’ reasoning can only come into effect once the own message is sent. This set-up 
is hence suitable to get a written account of the individual’s reasoning.
The first chapter presents the results from the ‘beauty contest’ game. This game is 
particularly suited to investigate the shape of the level distribution, the nature of the 
level-0 belief and the prevailing population belief. The second chapter presents results 
from the ‘hide and seek’ game. This game allows to investigate a non-random level-0
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belief as assumed to result from the non-neutral framing of the options. Furthermore, 
the population is divided into hiders and seekers according to the players’ tasks. It 
can be analysed to which extent the task of the player influences the level of reasoning 
and the level-0 belief.
The third chapter considers a theoretical model of career concerns. Career con­
cerns have been studied by economists since Holmstrom (1999, first published 1982) 
formalised the idea of Fama (1980) according to which concerns about reputation in 
the labour market suffice to mitigate moral hazard problems. Holmstrom shows that 
costly effort is exerted because it increases the agent’s expectation of future wages by 
increasing the market’s belief of the worker’s productivity.
In this chapter I explore implications of heterogeneity among the agents in addition 
to varying talent. The agents differ in the magnitude of career concerns, which leads 
them to exert different levels of effort in a given situation. If principals axe uncertain 
about this aspect of the agent’s type, I find that depending on the circumstances, this 
additional uncertainty might decrease total effort exertion over time.
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1 Estim ating the level-A; model: 
the ‘beauty contest’ game
1.1 In trod u ction
The contribution of this chapter is twofold: (a) it presents an experimental design 
which allows to obtain an incentivised written account of individual reasoning in one- 
shot games and (b) it applies this design to the ‘beauty contest’ game in order to 
estimate the structural parameters of the most prominent non-equilibrium model of 
individual reasoning in one-shot situations, the level-A; model.
We will show that the written accounts are rich in the sense that they convey 
information about the parameters of the level-A: model which were previously hard to 
bring to light. In particular, we apply our design to the classic ‘beauty contest’ game. 
In this game all players choose an integer between 0 and 100. The winner is the one 
whose choice is closest to p times the average of all numbers, p < 1. The unique Nash 
equilibrium is 0, however, in experiments most choices are between 20 and 50. It is 
the contribution of Nagel (1995) to point out how this can be explained by a level-A; 
model of reasoning.
We classify the transcribed communication from the first period of the game along 
the lines of a general level-A; model that nests previous contributions. Following this 
procedure, the vast majority of players was classified to follow a level-A; type of reason­
ing. The level of reasoning was unambiguously determined for 50 of the 84 subjects 
in our experiment. Of those subjects 17 were identified as level-0, 26 as level-1, 6 as 
level-2, and 1 as level-3 reasoner. Importantly this shows that the level-0 play is not 
only a thought experiment of higher level players but does actually exist. Further 20 
subjects were identified as level-A; reasoners, but only an interval of likely levels could 
be classified. For 36 subjects we could identify level-0 beliefs from the communication. 
For almost all players of at least level-2 the message allows to identify their popula­
tion belief, which is degenerate on level A; — 1 in 75% of the identified cases. Only two 
players identified the Nash equilibrium and only two players were classified to apply 
iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
We then use the information on the individuals’ levels to estimate econometri- 
cally the structural parameters of the level-A; model. In particular we show how this 
information can be used as constraints in a maximum-likelihood estimation of a gen­
eralised version of the level-A; model. For reasons outlined in section 1.6, a maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) of the level-A; model is not instructive under the standard 
assumptions in the literature. The model is generalised in the sense that rather than 
assuming that level-0 beliefs take the same value across players and that the level-0
1This chapter draws on work that was carried out jointly with equal share by Konrad B. Burchardi 
and me.
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play is uniformly distributed, we model both level-0 belief means and level-0 play 
as draws from appropriate distributions which are estimated jointly with the level-A; 
distribution. In this way we get estimates for all relevant parameters of the model. 
The estimated level-0 beliefs and actions are consistent with the information obtained 
in the communication classification. We use Monte Carlo studies to show that the 
estimator used is unbiased.
The estimates from this exercise shed light on which versions of the level-k model 
best reflect the individuals’ reasoning process. The observed levels of reasoning are 
surprisingly low. Our maximum likelihood estimate for the average level of reasoning is 
only 0.82. The distribution of the actions of level-0 players is estimated to be centered 
around 60 and does not appear to be uniform. The belief of higher-level players about 
the mean of the actions of level-0 players is centered at 53 and not consistent with 
the actions. These estimates discriminate between prevailing versions of the level-A; 
model, shed doubts on assumptions made by all versions of the model and lead us to 
different conclusions than we would have drawn had we applied estimation methods 
used elsewhere.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 introduces promi­
nent versions of the level-A: model. Section 1.3 relates our research methodology to 
other approaches in the literature. The description of the experimental design and the 
classification procedure is detailed in section 1.4. The main results are presented sub­
sequently in section 1.5. The MLE estimation is presented in section 1.6 and followed 
by the conclusion.
1.2 The Level-A; Model and its Variants
The seminal paper by Nagel (1995) introduced the level-A; model as outlined in the 
preface in order to explain the choice distribution in ‘beauty contest’ games. Subse­
quently, numerous studies have analysed experiments involving variants of the beauty 
contest game.2 Object of the variations are monetary incentives, equilibrium actions, 
subject populations, information environments and many more.
A recent variant of the level-A; model is the model of cognitive hierarchy (CH) in­
troduced by Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004). This model links various aspects of the 
level-A; concept using only one parameter. The model by Stahl and Wilson (1995) con­
siders probabilistic best responses in normal-form games, relaxing the full optimisation 
assumption. The setup by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford 
(2006) allows for and can identify dominance reasoners as well as sophisticated types, 
who know of the equilibrium but play a non-equilibrium best response.
Subsequently the shared characteristics of those non-equilibrium models of strate­
gic reasoning in the tradition of Nagel (1995) will be laid out and formalised. We will 
point out where the most prominent versions differ from each other.
2For an overview see the survey by Nagel (1999) and the paper by Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004).
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Let there be players i =  1 , N  and let their action be denoted as a* G A. In our 
case, the action space A  consists of all integers in the interval [0,100]. Let the level of 
reasoning be k = 0 ,1,2,3,.... Let the belief of a level-A; player with k > 1 about the 
proportion of level-z players in the population be denoted as bk(i), i < k — 1.
Level-0 players are defined as not best-responding to any belief. So while they 
might or might not have some belief about what others do, they do not take a belief 
into account when deciding on their strategy. Rather they are assumed to play non- 
strategically which is modeled as random draws from a distribution r°(a) defined over 
A.
Players of higher levels k > 1 form beliefs about the mean of the level-0 distribution
d. The distribution of level-0 mean beliefs is r(d). Given his level-0 mean belief a level 
k, k > 1, player will figure out how lower level players play and given his belief on their 
distribution, &&(&), he will find his best response. Note, that to be able to calculate 
the optimal strategy of some lower level player, a player with k > 3 needs to form 
a belief about the beliefs of player i, 2 < i < k — 1. In particular, a level-3 player 
needs to know what a level-2 player believes the relative proportions of level-0 and 
level-1 players are. These higher-order beliefs are in all versions of the level-A; model 
assumed to be consistent with the beliefs of a player of level i. Similarly a level-A; 
player, k > 2, needs to form a belief over the lower players’ beliefs of the mean of 
the level-0 distribution. This is generally assumed to be the same as a level-A; player’s 
own level-0 belief.
Given and f(a), the players are assumed to ‘best respond’, meaning that their 
strategy is found as Sk
sk(bk(’),r) = argmaxu(a;6fc(*),r). (1.1)
a£A
Lastly, the true distribution of level-A; types is denoted as l(k).
All models assume the level-0 distribution r°(a) to be a uniform distribution over 
the action space. This assumption is often justified by Bernoulli’s principle of insuffi­
cient reason. As well they share the assumption of rational expectations for the level-0 
mean beliefs, implying a belief r(a) degenerate at 50.
Under an assumption on the anchoring level-0 distribution, the level-A; distribution 
and a specification for &&(•) such a model is able to make a probabilistic prediction 
about the frequencies of strategies.3
1.2.1 The M odel of Nagel (1995)
The original model by Nagel (1995) assumes the players’ beliefs for k > 0 to be
h 1 i f i  =  k - l
) 0 otherwise.
3The prediction is probabilistic since the level-0 play is probabilistic.
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Given the common assumptions of a uniform r°(a) and rational expectations with 
respect to the level-0 play, a level-1 type would hence believe that everybody else is 
playing 50 on average. If p — | ,  his optimal strategy given this belief is to play 33. A 
level-2 type would, given the above bk(i) specification, believe that everybody else is 
level-1, hence playing 22. A level-3 type again believes that everybody else is a level-2 
type and so on. Together with any assumption on the distribution of types l(k) this 
gives a probabilistic prediction on the observed actions in a p-‘beauty contest’ and 
other games.
1.2.2 The M odel o f Stahl and W ilson (1995)
Stahl and Wilson (1995) consider a version where the best response is calculated with 
error. The level-0 distribution, r°(a), is assumed to be uniform across the action 
space again, which they think of as a fully imprecise best-response. Levels 1 and 2 
best respond with error, playing actions with a higher expected payoff with a higher 
probability, such that the optimisation principle behind equation 1.1 is relaxed. Higher 
levels than k = 2 are not considered. For the population distribution belief of level 2 
players, they allow for any combination of level-0 and level-1 players, not putting any 
restriction as opposed to all other models considered.
Apart from level reasoners, Stahl and Wilson (1995) consider some other reasoning 
types: ‘Naive Nash’ types that play the Nash equilibrium; ‘Worldly’ types that best- 
respond to a population of level-A; and ‘naive Nash’-types; and ‘rational expectation’ 
types that best-respond to a correct belief over the frequencies of all other types.4
1.2.3 The M odel of Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004)
The cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004) differs from the previous models 
in its assumptions about the belief formation. Rather than assuming that players 
believe all others to reason exactly one level lower than themselves, it is assumed that 
players believe the others to be a mixture of lower-level types. Further they assume 
that the players’ beliefs reflect the true relative frequencies of lower level types and 
that the true distribution of types l(k) follows a Poisson distribution with parameter 
r . This elegantly links the population distribution, the population beliefs and higher- 
order population beliefs5 with only one parameter. Formally, for all A; > 0,
X T Jo Htn-,r)
where
4Note that all of those types, except the ‘rational expectations’ type, can be thought of as being 
nested in the level-A framework.
5These axe modeled to be consistent with the actual population beliefs of lower-level types.
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A level-1 type still believes everybody else to be level-0 reasoners and plays 33. 
However, a level-2 type now believes both level-0 and level-1 reasoners to exist, their 
exact relation depending on the true population distribution, i. e. on the parameter r. 
Therefore, a level-2 type chooses an action higher than 22.
1.2.4 The M odel of Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001)
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) model the level-k types in the same fashion as Nagel (1995).
An innovation of Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) 
is to allow for a type that reasons along the lines of dominance. The original concept 
of dominance is not leading towards a point prediction of play. They propose a closure 
of the dominance reasoning by assuming a best response to a uniform distribution of 
actions that are remaining after a number of rounds of deletion of dominated strate­
gies. In their setup, they can empirically identify this form of dominance reasoning.6 
Further they consider ‘equilibrium’ types that play the Nash equilibrium strategy, 
similar to Stahl and Wilson’s ‘naive Nash’-types, and they call ‘sophisticated’ types 
those players that best respond to the actual distribution of others’ responses, similar 
to Stahl and Wilson’s ‘worldly’ and ‘rational expectation’ types.
The general model outlined at the beginning of this section nests all these possible 
specifications of the level-A; model. Note that ‘equilibrium’ and ‘sophisticated’ types 
are as well nested in the level-A; models as individuals with a high level of reasoning and 
appropriate population beliefs. The only exception are ‘dominance’ reasoners, which 
were identified separately in the classification procedure. Otherwise we classified the 
messages along the lines of this general model (see section 1.4.3 on the classification 
procedure) and section 1.6 will present the equivalent econometric model. Estimating 
this allows us to discriminate between the different sets of assumptions.
1.3 L iterature: E stim atin g  and T estin g  th e  Level-A; M odel
Most of the early studies which ‘test’ the level-A; model make use of choice data 
and conclude that the model does well in explaining the observations. The major 
problem in the falsification of the theory is the fact that the level-A; model offers many 
potential explanations for observed actions. In fact, if you just make assumptions 
on the -  so far -  unobserved parameters of interest, like the level-0 distribution, the 
level-A; distribution and the system of population beliefs, the model is able to explain 
any data. Hence, when using choice data only, the single way to estimate one of the 
model’s parameters is by making assumptions on the remaining subset of parameters.
In the early literature, qualitative insights about the underlying reasoning were 
obtained by asking subjects after the experiment as to how they made their choice in
6Whether this particular kind of closure models behaviour correctly is an empirical question. The 
two ‘dominance’ types in our data do not best respond to the actions remaining after one round of 
deletion, they rather play the midpoint of the remaining action interval.
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the game. A descriptive analysis of optionally given comments received in the con­
text of laboratory, classroom and field experiments is presented by Bosch-Domenech, 
Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002). Apart from the absent incentives to state one’s 
thoughts, a drawback of this kind of data is the temporal gap between the actual 
reasoning process and the report of the reasoning. Between the reasoning and the 
statement, influences coming from the game’s outcome, forgetfulness, further thoughts 
that occurred later or even direct communication might make the comments unreli­
able representatives of the true reasoning. Our design is immune to such critique since 
it allows to get verbal accounts of reasoning processes which are written during the 
actual thinking period and minimises the potentially biasing influences on the way 
from thinking to verbalising. Indeed, the standard theme in protocol analysis, the 
psychological research on methods of eliciting verbal accounts from participants, is 
that “[t]he closest connection between thinking and verbal reports should be found 
when participants were instructed to focus on the task while verbalising their ongoing 
thoughts” (Ericsson, 2002, p. 983).
Progress on this initial approach was made by analysing data on information search 
patterns as in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) and 
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2009). The two recent papers use decisions made in a 
16-period two person ‘beauty contest’ game without feedback and match the players’ 
16 choices with a typical fingerprint of, say, a level-1 player. In addition, they link 
search patterns to types. This interesting design allows them to obtain individual 
level estimates, however it does not allow to investigate non-uniform level-0 beliefs. 
An advantage of our setting is that there is no need for game repetitions, under which 
individual reasoning might evolve even without feedback. Furthermore, we are able to 
identify level-0 players, which is not possible in the multi-period ‘fingerprint’ analysis, 
where only non-random patterns with an underlying mechanism can be classified.
Attempts to obtain data other than mere choices are also prominent in the learning 
literature, where interview questions and attentional data are used to delimit different 
learning behaviour (Salmon, 2001, 2004). However, interview questions are not incen- 
tivised and attentional data can usually only be used in repeated games, in order to 
allow for players’ information search patterns to stabilise.
A further approach to identify the underlying parameters of the model is presented 
in the econometric study by Bosch-Domenech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2004). 
Here, the action data of many different ‘beauty contest’ games is used for a finite 
mixture analysis, a collection of superimposed bounded normal distributions to best 
fit the action data. Some of the estimated normal distributions can be associated with 
underlying levels of reasoning. While the procedure benefits from the high number of 
observations, it is limited in its interpretation of the underlying reasoning.7 In addi­
7For example, a very flat distribution centered around 36 is said to be part of the level-0 belief. 
Our results would suggest that this is not the case. Both because in our study the level-0 seems to 
be rather above 50 and the optimisation of level-1 players is subject to mistakes, which is the more 
likely effect caught in this distribution.
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tion, the data is aggregated among others from non-laboratory experimental settings 
which, due to the uncontrolled informational environment, makes it difficult to infer 
general patterns in individual reasoning.
At the heart of our approach lies the disclosure of reasoning processes thanks to 
the incentives to reveal the own thoughts in the team communication. The exper­
imental literature has used team setups on various occasions to get better insights 
into the reasoning process of subjects and to investigate the performance of teams 
as opposed to individuals. In that respect, our experimental design is related to the 
innovative study by Cooper and Kagel (2005) in which team players communicate via 
an instant messenger, allowing the experimenters to observe the speed of learning to 
play strategically. Video analyses are increasingly used to judge decision making in 
the Prisoner’s dilemma, the power-to-take game, the ultimatum game, etc. (Hennig- 
Schmidt and Geng, 2005; Geng and Hennig-Schmidt, 2007; Brosig, 2002). Kocher and 
Sutter (2005) play a repeated ‘beauty contest’ with teams of 3 players, showing that 
teams are better in playing strategically over time, though not initially. However, their 
experiment was not designed to obtain data which can be used to test the parametric 
assumptions of the level-A; model. In general, the main advantage of our design is the 
possibility to infer about individual’s reasoning by having only one, simultaneously 
exchanged message.
1.4 O bserving Individual R easoning: T h e E xperim en t
In this section we describe in detail our experimental design, lay out the experimental 
procedures and present our subject pool. In order to process the information contained 
in the written accounts of the individual reasoning in a structured way we classified 
the messages along the lines of a general level-A; model. We explain the details of this 
procedure in the last part of this section.
1.4.1 Experimental Design
The main difference to the standard ‘beauty contest’ treatments in the literature was 
the team play and the communication structure between the team players. Partici­
pants were randomly assigned in teams of 2 players. The two members of a team were 
connected through the chat module of the experimental software.8 The team setup 
was essential to the investigation of the individuals’ reasoning thanks to the following 
communication structure reflected in figure 1.1 (steps in brackets): After the explana­
tion of the rules of the game and the indication of being either a hider- or seeker-team, 
each team member could state a so-called ‘suggested decision’ and justify this in a 
message (I). Neither the size of the message nor the time to write it were limited. Once 
both team members finished entering their message, the suggested decisions and the 
messages were simultaneously exchanged (II). Since it was only possible to send this
8The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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one message, the entire communication was undertaken without any influence from 
the team partner, therefore reflecting individual reasoning.
In a next step (III), both team members would individually state their ‘final de­
cision’, knowing both the suggested decision and the message of the team partner. It 
was known to them that one of the two final decisions would be chosen randomly by 
the computer to count as the ‘team’s action’ (IV). Facing the 50% chance of having 
the team partner determine one’s action in the game gave the message the importance 
of being the only way to influence the partner’s decision.
Player 1 Player 2
I. Suggested Suggested
Decision Decision
&: M essage . & M essage .
II.
III.
IV.
Team  action
Final decisionF inal decision
F igure 1.1: Structure of the team communication.
This design ensures that there is a strong incentive to write down the full reasoning 
underlying the suggested decision in a clear and convincing way. Since this study 
considers exclusively individual reasoning and no team interaction, the analysis will 
make use of the suggested decision and the message from step I only.
1.4.2 E xperim en ta l S etup
We conducted a ‘beauty contest’ experiment which was run in 6 sessions in the Ex­
perimental Economics Laboratory of the Department of Economics in Royal Holloway 
(University of London). The 84 participants were mainly undergraduate students in 
Royal Holloway and all participants were recruited by the host institution. We had 
invited 18 students per session. Since some students did not show up we allowed the 
highest possible even number of students into the laboratory on a first-come-first-serve 
basis. This resulted in 2 sessions with 12, 14 and 16 participants each.
Out of the 84 students 15 were studying Economics, 13 of them being in their 
first year of studies, one in the second year and one being in the third year. 16 of 
the 84 students had received some form of training in game theory, but only 5 had 
been confronted with the beauty contest game before the experiment. The majority
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of students had participated in an economic experiment before. Table 1.1 summarises 
some of the participants’ background characteristics.
Table 1.1: Players’ Backgrounds.
Field of Study
Economics
15
Other
67
NA
2
Bachelors Masters Ph.D. Other
Degree 59 13 3 9
1st 2nd 3rd 4th or more
Year in Degree 54 14 12 4
Female Male
Gender 36 48
Mean St. Dev.
Age 21.48 4.38
Yes No
Game Theory Training 16 68
Yes No
Experimental Experience 65 19
Yes No
Beauty Contest Experience 5 79
Before the start of the ‘beauty contest’ game the participants were made familiar 
with the structure of the experiment and the messaging system in two practice rounds. 
These used the exact same software as above, but asked the teams to find the answer 
to two unrelated questions. Since it was important to avoid any pre-treatment sensi­
tisation to strategic considerations, we asked them to provide the year of two historic 
events. The questions in the test round were chosen relatively difficult to stimulate 
the use of the messaging system.9
We played the standard ‘beauty contest’ game where the winning team was the one 
closest to p  =  |  of the average and integer numbers between 0 and 100 were allowed. 
We repeated this game 3 times, since in this study we are interested in individual 
reasoning, we are exclusively concerned with the first round suggested decision and the 
accompanying first message, i. e. with the actions that took place before any interaction 
of the team players.10
The participants of the experiment were paid a show-up fee of £5 and the winning 
team won a prize of £20 (£10 per team player).
1.4.3 Classification o f com m unication tran sc r ip ts
As outlined before, the motivation of our experimental design is to learn from the 
players’ messages about their individual reasoning. For this we had the messages
9The questions were: “Which is the year of birth of Nicolaus Copernikus, the first astronomer to 
formulate a scientific heliocentric cosmology?” (1473) and “In which year died Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart, the famous composer of the Classical Era?” (1791).
10The analysis of the learning process is subject of a further project.
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classified by two research assistants (RA).
We are interested in 5 pieces of information: (i) How many steps of reasoning does 
the player apply? (ii) Which level-0 belief does he state, if any? (iii) Which population 
belief does he state, if any? Further, in order to investigate the prevalence of reasoning 
patterns different from level-A; reasoning we attempt to distinguish level, dominance, 
equilibrium and sophisticated players, by asking: (iv) Did the player recognize 0 as 
the unique equilibrium? (v) Did the player apply an iterated elimination of dominated 
strategies? If the equilibrium is recognised, the player will be classified as ‘equilibrium’ 
type if she played 0 and as ‘sophisticated’ type if she played a best response to a more 
realistic population belief.
We believe that questions (ii) and (iii) can be, if those beliefs are stated, unam­
biguously answered. Likewise questions (iv) and (v) can be unambiguously answered 
with a yes or no. However, we are aware that in some cases it might not be identi­
fiable from the communication how many steps of reasoning were applied exactly.n  
Therefore, we ask the classifiers to only indicate a lower and upper bound on the 
steps of reasoning, if the message lends itself to such inference. These were defined as 
the lowest and highest level of reasoning which could possibly be interpreted into the 
messages. The details of the classification instructions can be viewed in appendix A.5 
where they are reproduced.
When designing the classification procedure we intended to avoid two potential 
concerns: Firstly, the classifiers might try to extract more information than the mes­
sages actually contain. Our guiding principle in the classification procedure was there­
fore to take a cautious approach and instruct the classifiers not to note any information 
if it was not obviously contained in the message. And secondly, we were concerned 
that in the case of an ambiguous statement relatively low ‘suggested decisions’ might 
lead the classifiers to indicate a higher lower-bound on the level of reasoning than was 
clearly exhibited. We therefore did not reveal the choice data to the classifiers when 
asking for the lower-bound.12 Likewise we did not reveal the choice data when asking 
to indicate the level-0 and population-belief, hence ensuring that these would only 
be indicated when stated in the message.13 In contrast, when indicating the upper- 
bound, knowing about low choices should, if anything, lead the classifiers to indicate a 
higher upper-bound. Similarly, we revealed the choice data when asking the classifiers 
to indicate whether the message exhibited any elimination of dominated strategies 
or equilibrium reasoning, which should, if anything, bias the evidence against the
11Think for example of the imaginary statement: “I presume everybody else will play 33, so let 
us play 22.” This clearly exhibits one step of reasoning. But it seems possible, too, that the player 
skipped the first step of his reasoning when writing down his argument.
12Other studies applying a classification do apply a similar procedure in order to avoid any uncon­
scious alignment of the classification with the choice data that might result from implicit assumptions 
(Rydval, Ortmann and Ostatnicky, 2007, for example).
13In some messages the level-0 belief was given as an interval. We asked the classifiers to indicate 
the mid-point in this case.
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prevalence of level-A; reasoning.14
The classification was undertaken by two Ph.D. students in the Department of 
Economics at LSE. The instructions were written by the two authors, of which one 
had taken a look at the communication transcripts beforehand. The instructions were 
self-contained and were not complemented by verbal comments. Remaining questions 
were answered via an e-mail list that included all four persons involved and which can 
be obtained from the authors. As detailed earlier, the classification was split in two 
parts. The documents for the second part were only given out once the first part was 
completed. After considering each part individually, the two research assistants met 
to reconcile their judgements and come up with a joint classification, if possible. We 
had specified rules how to make cautious use of their individual classifications in case 
of disagreement.
The two RA’s did not have major discrepancies in their judgements and the data 
we use is exclusively agreed upon by both. This hints towards a robust classification 
which can be replicated easily. Examples of the classification will be given in section 
1.5.
1.5 R esu lts
Before presenting the results obtained from the classification of the players’ commu­
nication we will first describe their choices in the game played.
1.5.1 A ction d a ta
Figure 1.2 shows histograms of the suggested decisions by session from the first period 
of the beauty contest game. Table 1.2 gives aggregate summary statistics for all 6 
session. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show histograms of the suggested decision and the final 
decisions aggregated over all sessions.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. N
All Sessions
Suggested Decision 43.93 21.14 40 0 100 84
Final Decision 39.73 18.75 35 0 100 84
Team Action 40.02 18.98 35.5 16 100 84
The data on ‘suggested decisions’ is comparable to data from the first periods of 
other experiments with individual participants. However, the data on ‘final decisions’ 
is not, since the participants have, at the time of taking this decision, already received 
a message from their team partner. For the subsequent analysis and classification of 
the individual reasoning we will use exclusively the ‘suggested decision’. The data on
14For this paxt of the classification we provided the classifiers with the message and choice data from 
the first period. Further we provided all data from later periods, which -  according to the classifiers 
-  was not consulted for any participant.
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Figure 1.2: Suggested decisions by session.
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Figure 1.3: Suggested decisions. Figure 1.4: Final decisions.
the ‘suggested’ and ‘final decisions’ looks similar to data generated in other comparable 
experiments in having similar means and a high fraction of choices between 22 and
50.15
Several other aspects of our choice data are in interesting ways similar to the 
results of other experiments. The ‘final decisions’ of the participants are on average 
lower.16 This supports the intuition that exchanging messages in a group-decision 
making process might increase the level of reasoning and hence, in the beauty contest 
game, decrease the chosen numbers on average. Moreover the variance of decisions 
across participants decreases after the exchange of the message and outliers become 
fewer, again supporting the idea that level-0 players, who potentially chose the outliers, 
become fewer. This effect of group decision making adds to the results of Kocher and 
Sutter (2005), who find an average of 34.99 when playing with 17 individuals but an
15It might be puzzling to see the spike at 40, but since the design allowed to look behind the scenes 
of reasoning, we can show that some level-0 players simply chose 40 and some level-1 players had 
a level-0 belief mean of 60. This shows how our design relaxes the dependence on the action data, 
allowing an analysis of the structural characteristics of reasoning.
16The exception to this rule is Treatment 2 where we find a slightly higher average.
81
1 THE ‘BEAU TY C O N TEST GAME 25
average of only 30.78 when playing with 17 groups. However, they allowed for free 
communication while we restricted the communication to one message only and their 
groups were composed of 3 individuals each. Both could explain the slightly stronger 
effect of group play in their study.
Furthermore the literature suggests that for treatments with higher numbers of 
players the average tends to decrease. Nagel (1995) and Kocher and Sutter (2005) 
played games with 14-16 and 17 participants, and found an average first round play 
of 36.6 and 34.99, respectively. Indeed this is below the average of 43.93 observed in 
our data with groups sizes of 12-16.
We discussed possible influences the design with explanatory messages might have 
on the reasoning at an earlier point. A possible objection to our procedure is that 
having to write down their reasoning might increase the participants’ level of reasoning,
e. g. because the participants would examine the task at hand more thoroughly in order 
to be able to state sensible arguments in the communication. The fact that our data 
exhibits if anything higher action choices comforts us in this respect.
Note that the ‘team’s action’ is a random draw of the 2 ‘final decisions’ in each 
group and hence, not surprisingly, their relation to the ‘final decision’ shows no sys­
tematic pattern.
1.5.2 C om m unication inform ation
Let us now present the additional data we were able to obtain through the experi­
mental procedure outlined earlier. The following representative examples of commu­
nication give an idea of how the classification of the bounds works:
“it ’s quite random, so just guess”
(Suggested decision: 58; lower and upper bound: 0)
“Well, i suppose mopst of the field will choose big numbers so that average 
will go up to 60-70. 2/3 of this number would be in range of 40-45”
(Suggested decision: 42; lower and upper bound: 1; level-0 mean belief:
65)
“lets say everyone thinks the average will be 50 based on random probability 
and 2/3rds of that will be about 34 hence they will mostly be choosing 
around 34 only making the average 34 and its 2/3rd to be around 21” 
(Suggested Decision: 21; lower and upper bound: 2; level-0 mean belief:
50; degenerate population belief)
Level o f R easoning Table 1.3 presents the lower and upper bounds on the indi­
viduals’ levels of reasoning. For 70 subjects both a lower and an upper bound was 
indicated. Eight subjects do not appear in the table due to a non-classified upper
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bound. Another 6 participants did not make any statement. We classified the bounds 
on the level of reasoning both when an individual applied a (possibly iterated) elimi­
nation of dominated strategies, which leaves him with a set of non-eliminated actions, 
and a level-fc type of reasoning, which derives from a level-0 belief and gives a unique 
action prediction. However, only 2 participants were found to apply an elimination of 
dominated strategies.
For 50 of the 84 participants the lower and the upper bounds coincide («  60%) and 
we could hence fully determine their level of reasoning. As can be seen on the diagonal 
of the table, these are 17 level-0, 26 level-1, 6 level-2 and 1 level-3 players. For further 
20 players we can restrict their level of reasoning to be one of two possibilities. Only for 
one subject we have an interval between 0 and 2. None of those subjects for who both 
a lower and upper bound is indicated was classified as potentially reasoning higher 
than level 3. Note that those players who identified the equilibrium were not given 
any upper-bound. The bounds on the level of reasoning will be used as constraints in 
the maximum likelihood estimation of section 1.6. The data by subject is presented 
in tables 1.8-1.10 in appendix A.3 on pages 39-41.
These results allow us to draw two important conclusions on debates in the lit­
erature: Firstly, the big majority of subjects did follow a level-A: type of reasoning 
and only very few follow a deletion of dominated strategies type of reasoning. And 
secondly, level-0 players are not only a thought experiment of higher-level players but 
do actually exist.
Table 1.3: Classification results.
Level Upper Bounds 
0 1 2  3 Total
0 17 11 1 0 29
Level Lower Bounds 1 26 3 0 29
2 6 5 11
3 1 1
Total 17 37 10 6 70
Level-0 B elief The results of the classification of the belief about the mean of 
the level-0 distribution are depicted in the histogram in figure 1.5. For 36 subjects 
the mean of the level-0 belief could be identified. While the large majority of 21 
participants mentioned a belief of exactly 50 or an interval centered around 50, 13 
others had a higher level-0 belief, between 55 and 100, in their mind. Two players 
indicated a lower belief of 40 and 45, respectively. Two players expected other players 
to play ‘something above 50’ and were not classified.
Level-0 A ctions Figure 1.6 shows the suggested decisions of players who were clas­
sified to be level-0 reasoners. In order to check whether the beliefs are consistent
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Figure 1.5: Level-0 beliefs from the 
communication.
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Figure 1.6: Suggested decisions of 
players classified to be level-0.
with these level-0 actions, table 1.4 shows the summary statistics of the suggested 
decisions of participants that were classified as level-0 and of the level-0 beliefs. It can 
be seen that both of them are substantially above 50. When looking at the standard 
deviation and the extrema, the distribution of level-0 players’ suggested decisions is 
less concentrated, as can be seen from the histogram in figure 1.6. We will come back 
to this interesting feature in the estimation section.
Table 1.4: Level-0 action and level-0 beliefs.
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. N
Level-0 suggested decision 62.35 22.39 60 16 100 17
Level-0 belief 55.26 12.33 50 40 100 36
The above shows the suggested decisions of players classified to be level-0 and the 
level-0 beliefs of higher level players.
The information about the individuals’ level-0 mean beliefs will allow us to analyse 
whether the best responses are best thought of as probabilistic as proposed by Stahl 
and Wilson (1995). Appendix A.2 will show that there are frequent deviations between 
the suggested decision and the optimal best response given the belief and the level 
estimate.
Population Belief The final relevant parameter to characterise the players’ level 
reasoning is the population belief. Among the 12 players with a lower bound of at 
least 2, 9 were having a degenerate population belief, expecting everybody else to be of 
one level below. 3 participants were classified as having a non-degenerate population 
belief. It is unclear whether these 3 are modeled appropriately by the non-degenerate 
population belief as postulated by Camerer et al. (2004).17 In any case, all three
17The messages sent were as follows:
T  reckon the average will be players saying 66 /100  approx due to it being two thirds.
I  believe we should say two thirds of that number which would range between 40 and 
50 The lower range will probably be a w iser move as a few  others will estim ate lower. 
Personally i would be happy with anything between 38-42.”
“promded that a number of people will go fo r  answer of 2/3 s  of a 100 (66) then we should 
go fo r  an answer that is 2 /3 ’s of that (44)> however, i suggest we scale the number down
1 THE ‘BEAU TY CONTEST’ GAME 28
statements were given an upper bound of 3. In particular none of them was clearly 
classified as level-2, the lowest level of reasoning with higher-order beliefs. So in our 
arguably small sample the rather complex non-degenerate higher-order population- 
beliefs correlate positively with higher levels of reasoning.
E quilib rium  and  D om inance R easoning Lastly, the analysis of the equilibrium 
and dominance indicators shows that only two players identified the Nash equilibrium, 
one of them being an ‘equilibrium’-type that suggests playing 0, another one being 
‘sophisticated’ in the sense that she imitated a level-2 player and suggested 20. Two 
other players were classified to apply iterated deletion of dominant strategies. No­
tably, the one round of deletion of dominated strategies was not followed by a best 
response. In that sense the assumption of Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) that the deletion 
of dominated strategies is followed by a best response to the remaining actions is not 
confirmed in our data.
In conclusion, we believe that the descriptive information about the reasoning 
process underlying the players’ choices is in itself informative. Despite a careful clas­
sification our experimental approach allows us to find tight bounds on the individual 
levels of reasoning with the majority of players not making more than one step of 
reasoning. The players’ belief about the mean of the level-0 players’ action is 50 or 
slightly higher, empirically supporting the assumptions made in previous contribu­
tions. The population belief of the classified players above level-1 is mostly identified 
to be of the degenerate type. It seems unnecessary to consider more complex types 
of population beliefs in the level of reasoning model, which ultimately enables us to 
have a workable model with less parameters.
1.6 M axim um  Likelihood E stim ation
In the previous section we have presented the results of the classification procedure. 
We saw how we can learn about the \eve\-k parameters of individuals. Now we use 
the obtained intervals on the levels of reasoning to estimate a structural model for 
the entire population. We assume a degenerate population belief as suggested by the 
communication, but the classified level-0 beliefs do not enter the estimation.18 We 
present a generalised model which nests the previously presented models and estimate 
its parameters with a maximum likelihood estimation.
slightly if  other teams do the same as ourselves, therefore I  suggest 38. I  am open to 
your theory”
“i guess if most people assume the teams average will be 50 then they will expect (2 /3) 
to be aprox 33 and thiss will be their guess which would mean our guess should be 22 
however if  other people assume the same then (2 /3 ) average will be more like 7 want to 
go with somewhere in the m idd le...#  12?”.
18They enter the analysis on the precision of best responses in appendix A.2.
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1.6.1 An Estimable Model
When trying to evaluate the level-k model empirically and testing hypotheses about 
its parameters, standard maximum likelihood methods cannot be reliably applied. 
The problem is that for any distribution l(k) and r°(a) most versions of the model 
make stark predictions on the action of any player with k > 0. Any action just slightly 
off this predicted action will be identified as random level-0 play. Small perturbations 
of the action data might hence lead to substantially different results when performing 
the maximum likelihood estimation.19
To understand the root of this problem, note first that only the mean of the players’ 
level-0 belief is relevant for their decision. Let this be denoted as a. Now, underlying 
the stark predictions is the fact that all players have the same belief about r°(a) and 
hence respond to the exact same mean. Therefore, all players of the same level of 
reasoning will choose the same ‘optimal’ response. Since the level-k model usually 
retains the optimisation principle, room for error is neither in the decision-making nor 
in the belief formation.
We estimate a modified model along the lines of the generalised model presented 
in section 1.2. In particular we assume that the players’ belief about the mean of the 
level-0 play comes itself from a distribution f(a). This might -  as assumed in the 
versions of the level-k presented earlier -  or might not be collapsed at the mean of 
r°(a). It means that we allow the actions of, say, two level-1 players to differ if their 
belief about the level-0 mean is different.20 This avoids the stark predictions described 
earlier and allows to apply a maximum likelihood estimation. Furthermore estimating 
both the level-0 belief distribution and the level-0 action distribution jointly with 
the level-A; distribution allows us to check whether the level-0 actions and beliefs are 
consistent. We will specify different functional forms for r°(a) and f(a), each of which 
will depend on two parameters a, (3 and d, /?, respectively.
Let us lay out how we use this generalisation in order to estimate the level-& model 
with a maximum likelihood estimation. We observe a sequence of N  actions { d i } ^  
and use MLE to get the estimates f  for the population distribution Z(fc, r) , a, (3 for the 
level-0 distribution r(a; a, (3) and a, (3 for the distribution of beliefs about the mean 
of the level-0 distribution f(a ;d , ^). Assuming independent actions, the likelihood 
function of the sequence { a i} ^  is
N
HMiLi) = nF(cLi-,T,oi,(3,a,l3)
i=1
19In the discussion of the variation in the suggested decisions in appendix A .2, it can be seen in 
figure 1.10 that only 4 of 31 players played a ‘precise’ best response. Most players would be identified 
as level-0 in the mentioned estimation, leading to an upward biased estimate of the proportion of 
non-strategic players.
20This indirectly softens the optimisation principle in the spirit of Stahl and Wilson (1995). Our 
model allows for heterogeneous beliefs, but not for imprecise best responses. The latter are, however, 
picked up in the form of a higher level-0 mean belief variance.
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The log-likelihood function is then
N
logL(r, a, =  ]T lo g .F (r, a , /?, ar, 0; a*)
2= 1
Note how the function T  takes into account the structure of the level-m odel: 
Generally an action can be justified by k = 0 and many combinations of k and a 
with k > 0. An action a* of for example 40 could come from a level-0 player. Then 
the possible likelihood contribution is
1(0; t ) T°(40;a,/3).
But as well it can be justified by, e.g. k = I and a = 60. The likelihood contribu­
tion of this would be
*(l;r) -f(60; &,/?).
Among the likelihood contributions of all possible levels k, the pair (fc, a0) or 
(k, a) with the highest likelihood contribution will be selected in order to proceed in 
the calculation of the log-likelihood function.21 Formally, this can be reflected as
a,/?; a,i) =  max ( l(0;r) -r°(a0’, a, (3), max l(k; r) • r(h(k, a*); d, /?) I 
\ {(fc,o)l*>0} J
Hence, the maximisation of the likelihood function proceeds in two steps: First, 
given each possible tuple of parameters, we find for each individual the combination of 
(k, a) which gives the highest likelihood contribution and calculate the ‘maximum’ log- 
likelihood given the tuple of parameters. In a second step we then find the maximum 
likelihood estimate for the structural parameter of the model. When we subsequently 
talk about the ‘level identification of individuals from the estimation’ we will refer 
to the values of k which were obtained in the first step of this procedure for the 
maximum-likelihood estimates.
While this is the way the estimation is constructed, the first step of the maximisa­
tion can be controversial because the second step is then taken as if the subject’s level 
was known with certainty, which it is not. It might be better justified to maintain 
a probabilistic view on the level throughout the estimation. A mixture model with 
the following log-likelihood function would reflect that a subject is of level-/c with a 
certain probability.
21 Since we axe interested in estimating a general model of reasoning in one-shot games, we included 
all players in this estimation, even if they were identified as dominance or equilibrium reasoners. We 
have checked that our later analysis is robust to the exclusion of equilibrium players.
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N I
log L(r, a , p, a, /?; {a*}^) = ^  log I ^  i(fc, r)  • r fe(h(fc, a*), a , /?, a , (3)
i = 1 \  k
It is assumed that this alternative approach will not lead to major differences in 
the estimates to be presented at a later point.
For both approaches, note that the population belief pins down the mean of the 
level-0 belief h(k, a*) as a function of the level k and the played action a*. These beliefs 
will generally differ for degenerate or non-degenerate population belief structures.22 
Note as well that the number of possible levels might be limited by the fact that for 
higher levels, the corresponding mean of the level-0 belief will eventually be higher than 
100.23 Furthermore, the information from the communication data will be imposed 
as constraint on the possible levels. Any levels that can be excluded thanks to the 
communication analysis will be associated with a zero likelihood.
We mostly assume the population distribution to be Poisson as in equation 1.2, 
but we also show general results without a distribution assumption. For the distribu­
tions r(a) and r°(a) we use a bounded normal distribution with mean a  and standard 
deviation /?, respectively. We also ran estimations with a beta distribution with pa­
rameters a  and /? which nests the uniform distribution as a special case. There are 
no notable differences between the estimation outcomes.
1.6.2 M LE w ith  com m unication inform ation
When using the lower and upper bounds on the levels of reasoning as constraints in 
the estimation the likelihood function is well-behaved and exhibits an interior global 
maximum as can be seen in figure 1.7.24 Furthermore, Monte Carlo studies show 
that this estimator is indeed unbiased for all five parameters of interest. This is not 
the case for estimators which use only the lower bound or no bound at all, which is 
precisely why MLE could not be applied in other studies.
The estimates obtained when applying this procedure are presented in table 1.5.25 
They allow us to scrutinise some of the assumptions made in the literature and hence 
test the different versions of the level-fc model presented earlier.
Level-0 A ctions and  Beliefs Consider first our estimates on the anchoring element 
of the level-m odel: the distribution of non-strategic (‘level-0’) play. In the previous 
literature this has been assumed to be uniformly distributed on the action space. The 
belief of other players about the mean of the non-strategic play was then assumed
22If we decided to have heterogeneous types of population beliefs, this would be reflected by hi(k, at.
23Whether this can happen depends on the type of population belief.
24 Note that the points in the graph represent the likelihood for different values of the level-0 mean 
and the population r  after maximising over the parameters which are not represented in the graph.
25The parameters are the mean and standard deviation of the bounded normal distribution.
1 THE ‘BEAUTY CONTEST’ GAME 32
-450
-500 -
-550
-600
- 6 5 0 -
-700
100
-750
1.5
0.5
Level-0 action meanPopulation i
Figure 1.7: Log-likelihood contours under lower and upper bounds from
communication.
to be 50. In line with the latter assumption, our estimate of the mean of the level- 
0 belief of those players who are estimated to have a positive level of reasoning is 
indeed estimated close to 50. Figure 1.8 shows the pdf of the estimated level-0 belief 
distribution.
However, this belief is not consistent with the actual mean of the non-strategic 
play, which is estimated to be substantially higher at 60.14. When simulating the 
distribution of our estimator under the null hypothesis of a true level-0 action mean 
of 50, the 97.5th percentile is 58.07, below our estimate. We can therefore reject the 
hypothesis that the true level-0 action mean was 50 at the 5% level. See appendix A.l 
and Study 2 in table 1.7 for details. Furthermore, the level-0 action distribution does 
not resemble a uniform distribution. We also generate data according to a uniform 
distribution and use an ML-estimator based on the beta distribution. The 97.5th 
percentile estimate for the distribution’s a-parameter is 1.98, substantially below the 
estimate of 2.48 for our data. Figure 1.9 shows the resulting shape of the distribution 
with a mean of the bounded normal of 60.14 and mode of 68.32. Note that both figures 
1.8 and 1.9 are consistent with the according data from the communication which was 
presented in figures 1.5 and 1.6. This suggests that obtaining bounds on the level of 
reasoning is sufficient to back out the level-0-actions and -beliefs econometrically.
It has been raised that the mean of the level-0 action distribution is estimated to 
be higher than 50 because the estimation by design attributes actions of levels higher
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Table 1.5: Maximum-likelihood estimates.
Global max
Level-0 action mean 60.14
Level-0 action s.d. 18.85
Level-0 belief mean 53.16
Level-0 belief s.d. 15.04
T 0.82
The estimation was constrained by lower- 
and upper-bounds, using separate level-0 
action- and belief-distributions.
Level 0 belief (meen-53 16. stdev-15 04)
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0 005
0
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Figure 1.8: Estimated level-0 belief 
distribution.
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Figure 1.9: Estimated level-0 action 
distribution.
than 66 to level-0. We believe that this is not of concern for us. Firstly, the levels are 
often observed and indeed many players have been identified as level-0 while playing 
a number lower than 66. Secondly, in Monte Carlo studies our estimator is unbiased 
for the means of the level-0 action and level-0 belief distribution.
The estimates of the level-0 beliefs and actions raise interesting questions. The first 
one is why the actions are drawn to high numbers. This might suggest a surprising 
attraction to the upper bound 100, which some not only have as a level-0 belief, but 
also suggest as action. Furthermore, the number |  in the rules of the game might 
make numbers close to 66 somehow salient. But it should be noted that messages of 
individuals who were classified as level-0 players and play numbers around 66 show 
no sign of any strategic consideration like dominance reasoning. A second interesting 
issue concerns the classified level-0 beliefs depicted earlier in figure 1.5. When different 
from 50 these are almost always higher than 50 -  to some extent consistent with 
the actual level-0 play. However, although both estimates are above 50, the level-0 
beliefs do not seem to be consistent with the actions of level-0 players. Thirdly, the 
distribution of beliefs about the mean of the non-strategic play is more concentrated 
than the non-strategic play itself.26 Overall, the results suggest that it is problematic 
to impose consistency between actions and beliefs, as it is to assume a level-0 play 
centered around 50.
26This might hint to the belief formation being adequately modeled as making several draws from 
the underlying level-0 action distribution and taking the mean over these imaginary draws.
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Table 1.6: Our and Other Results.
34
O ur D a ta CG C D a ta
Poisson General CHC
(1) (ib) (2) (2b) (3) (4) (4b)
T 0.82 - 0.43
Ao 0.44° 0.36 0.65“
Ai 0.36° 0.47 0.28“
A2 0.14“ 0.15 0.06“
A3 0.04“ 0.02 0.01“
L0 30 (35.7%) 29 (34.5%) -
LI 37 (44.0%) 38 (45.2%) 27 (30.7%)
L2 12 (14.3%) 12 (14.3%) 17 (19.3%)
L3 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.1%)
D1 2 (2.4%) 2 (2.4%) 1 (1.1%)
S2 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.2%) l b (1.1%)
E 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.2%) 11 (12.5%)
n.c. - - 30 (34.1%)
N 84 84 84 88
° Values implied by the Poisson distribution with the f  parameter. 
6 ‘Sophisticated’ without level indication.
Level-fc D is trib u tio n  Finally, let us turn to the second crucial parameter of the 
level-/c model, the average level of reasoning r . We estimate this to be 0.82. Compared 
to other studies with a similar student population, this is a low value (See Camerer 
et al., 2004). Table 1.6 presents our results and those of Costa-Gomes and Craw­
ford (2006). Column (1) presents the types estimated in the constrained maximum 
likelihood estimation with an underlying Poisson distribution. The first row gives 
the r  estimate obtained, the next 4 rows give the frequencies of level-types implied 
by the r  estimate. The bottom of the table presents the frequencies of individual 
level-estimates. Combined with the classification information on dominance reason­
ing and equilibrium identification these give the type estimates presented. Column 
(lb) gives their relative frequency and shows that more than 80% are classified to be 
either level-0 or level-1 players. When comparing the Poisson frequencies in (1) with 
the type frequencies in (lb) is can be seen that the shape of the Poisson distribution 
fits only roughly the estimated type distribution. We therefore performed an MLE 
estimation without the Poisson assumption, estimating the frequencies of level-0 to 
level-3 types with 3 parameters. The results are presented in column (2). Column (3) 
shows the results we would have obtained, had we applied the method of moments 
approach used by Camerer et al. (2004) to our average ‘suggested decision’ of 43.93. 
This method would have led us to think that many individuals were level-0 reasoners, 
while we actually identify them to have made 1 or 2 steps of reasoning.
Comparing our results to the type distribution of Costa-Gomes and Crawford 
(2006) in the two last columns (CGC, 88 subjects in total), it is striking that the
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frequencies of LI, L2, L3, D1 and Sophisticated are very similar.27 But in contrast 
to their results we identify a substantial fraction of the population to be playing 
non-strategically.
1.7 C onclusion
This chapter has presented data and estimation results from a beauty-contest game 
with team-communication.
Applying the experimental design to the ‘beauty-contest’ game allows us to find 
estimates of parameters of a prominent model of boundedly rational play: the level-A; 
model. These estimates cannot be obtained by only looking at choice data. Generally, 
we can view the communication transcripts as clear evidence for level reasoning by the 
large majority of subjects. Furthermore, level-0 reasoners do actually exist and are 
not only a thought experiment of higher level players. The implied level-A: distribution 
is contrasted to the ones found in recent studies. Further, we confirm a level-0 belief 
distribution centered around or slightly above 50. The actions of level-0 players are, 
however, still higher than those, implying an inconsistency between beliefs and actions. 
We do find that higher level players mostly believe other players to be one level below 
them, an assumption formulated in Nagel (1995). This sheds doubts on the assumption 
of consistency of the population beliefs with the true populations distribution as is 
underlying the model of cognitive hierarchy proposed by Camerer et al. (2004).
27We have fewer people playing equilibrium, but the equilibrium play in the standard ‘beauty 
contest’ might be a bit more subtle since it is not reached after a finite number of rounds of iterated 
deletion of dominated strategies.
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A  A p p en d ix
A .l Monte Carlo studies
We use Monte Carlo studies in order to analyse the properties of our maximum like­
lihood estimators in section 1.6. By design, the Monte Carlo results are specific to 
the parameters for which the data is generated. To claim unbiasedness of our estima­
tors, we investigate this property of our estimator for a set of parameter values in the 
vicinity of the estimate values.
We generate data with 84 datapoints reflecting the total number of datapoints in 
our study. In a first step, we assume that the true data generating process for the level- 
0 mean is reflected correctly by random draws from a bounded normal distribution.28 
Similarly, the level of reasoning is assumed to be correctly represented by random 
draws from the Poisson distribution.
In addition we need to calibrate the data to the output of the classification of the 
communication. The lower and upper bounds on the levels are generated by assuming 
uniformly distributed errors in the observation. Unless otherwise stated, they are 
specified such that the probability of being one level away from the truth is 0.28 for 
each lower and upper bound. In our sample, 72% of the complete level classifications 
are precise up to one remaining level value. Using a probability of imprecision of 
0.28 for both lower and upper bound gives a higher overall probability that the level 
classification is only precise up to two level values.29 Furthermore, there are subjects 
whose communication does not lend itself to any classification. We reflect this by not 
giving a value for the bounds in 17% of the observations, matching our 14 out of 84 
non-classifications.
In the following, we show results indicating that our estimators are unbiased for a 
sample size of 84. One estimate of particular interest is the level-0 action mean. We 
show results for three different values of this mean in the true data generating process. 
We add another set of results that assumes a more successful classification procedure 
in order to analyse the estimates’ sensitivity in this respect (Study 2).
It can be seen that the estimates are generally very close to the true underlying 
parameter values, indicating that potential biases are of negligible magnitude. We are 
therefore confident that the results presented in section 1.6 are informative about the 
parameters of the level-m odel in our sample.
28We also run studies with an underlying beta distribution that nests the uniform distribution. The 
estimation faxes slightly worse but delivers qualitatively very similar results.
29In our sample we have one classification with three possible level values, which corresponds to 
1.2%. In our calibration such imprecision arises with probability 7.9%.
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Table 1.7: Monte Carlo results for different level-0 action means.
Study 1 Study 2
Data generation Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Level average 0.80 0.69 0.16 0.76 0.11
Level-0 action mean 50.00 47.75 6.20 49.82 4.21
Level-0 action st. dev. 19.61 18.35 2.47 17.89 2.21
Level average 0.80 0.75 0.13 0.79 0.07
Level-0 action mean 56.94 57.39 5.22 57.21 2.68
Level-0 action st. dev. 19.13 18.20 2.51 18.58 1.74
Level average 0.80 0.76 0.10 0.79 0.12
Level-0 action mean 61.61 61.61 5.72 61.42 4.35
Level-0 action st. dev. 18.14 17.66 2.92 17.48 2.61
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A .2 V ariability in th e  best responses
Our data allows us to look at the discrepancy between the observed suggested decision 
on the one hand and the decision that would be prescribed by the stated level-0 belief 
and the estimated level on the other hand. By comparing these two values we can 
analyse to which extent the assumption of probabilistic best responses as in Stahl and 
Wilson (1995) is appropriate. For this purpose we use the ML-estimates of the levels 
from section 1.6 and the stated level-0 beliefs from the communication to calculate 
the ‘precise’ best-response.
We restrict ourselves to the 31 observations for which we have the stated level-0 
belief and which are higher than level-0. Figure 1.10 depicts the absolute deviation of 
the suggested decision from this theoretically expected decision. It shows a roughly 
symmetric distribution centered at 0. The median deviation is 0, implying a balance 
between deviations to both sides. The mean deviation of 1.55 is slightly higher than 
0 and influenced by some outliers on the right hand side of the distribution. The 
standard error is 6.75, which indicates that there is a substantial fraction of players 
playing an action distant from a ‘precise’ best response. It indicates that the assump­
tion of a probabilistic best response as in Stahl and Wilson (1995) probably reflects 
actual decision making in a better way than the optimisation principle.30
At the same time, it might be a stretch to take the stated number for the level-0 
belief too literal. Rather than picking up noise in the best response, we might be 
picking up temporal variations in the beliefs.
I
»
Figure 1.10: Deviation of suggested decision from ‘precise’ best response.
Absolut© deviation
30This result can be seen as an additional piece of evidence in the literature on imprecision in 
choices and valuations, extended to best responses to beliefs. See Butler and Loomes (2007) and the 
literature cited therein.
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A .3 C lassification and  estim ation  by sub jec t
Table 1.8 to 1.10 on the next pages show the estimation and classification by subject. 
Table 1.8: Classification and estimation by subject (Sessions 1-2).
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A.4 E xperim en t instructions 
W elcom e to  th e  experim ent!
In tro d u ctio n
You are about to participate in an experiment in team decision making. The experi­
ment is funded by the Michio Morishima fund, the London School of Economics and 
the German Society of Experimental Economic Research. Please follow the instruc­
tions carefully.
In addition to the participation fee of £5, you may earn a considerable additional 
amount of money. Your decisions and the decisions of the other participants determine 
the additional amount. You will be instructed in detail how your earnings depend on 
your and the others’ decisions. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to 
you in private, in cash, after today’s session.
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s 
screens. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your 
hand, and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you 
will be asked to leave. Thank you.
Since this is a team experiment, you will at various times be matched randomly 
with another participant in this room, to form a team that plays as one entity. Your 
team’s earnings will be shared equally between you and your team partner.
The experiment consists of two parts (P a rt I and P a r t  II) which are independent 
of each other and feature different tasks. Part I consists of three rounds and Part II 
consists of four rounds. However, the way you interact as a team to take decisions 
will be the same throughout the two parts.
Now, let us explain how your T eam ’s A c tio n  is determined. In fact, both your 
team partner and you will enter a Final D ecision  individually and the computer 
will choose randomly which one of your two final decisions counts as your team’s 
action. The probability that your team partner’s final decision is chosen is equal to 
the probability that your final decision will be chosen (i.e. your chances are 50:50). 
However, you have the possibility to influence your partner’s final decision in the 
following way: Before you enter your final decision, you can propose to your partner a 
Suggested D ecision  and send him one and only one text M essage. Note that this 
message is your only chance to convince your partner of the reasoning behind your 
suggested decision. Therefore, use the message to explain your suggested decision to 
your team partner. After you finish entering your suggested decision and your message, 
these will be shown to your team partner. She/he will then make her/his final decision. 
Similarly, you will receive your partner’s suggested decision and message. You will 
then make your final decision. As outlined above, once you both enter your final 
decision, the computer chooses randomly one of your final decisions as your team’s
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action.
If you have any questions at this point, please raise your hand. In order for you 
to get familiar with the messaging system, you will now try it out in a Test Period . 
Please turn the page for further instructions.
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Test period
A participant in this room is now randomly chosen to be your team partner. The 
Test P eriod  has two rounds, with one question to answer in each round. Since this 
is only a test, your earnings will not depend on any decision taken now. In both test 
rounds you will need to answer a question about the year of an historic event. The 
team that is closest to the correct year wins.
As described, you will be able to send one Suggested D ecision  with your pro­
posed year and an explaining M essage . After having read your partner’s suggested 
decision and message, you will enter your Final D ecision. As described earlier, ei­
ther your or your partner’s final decision will be chosen randomly to be your Team ’s 
Action.
The messenger allows M essages of any size. However, you have to enter the 
message line by line since the input space is only one line. Within this line you can 
delete by using the usual “Backspace” button of your keyboard. By pressing “Enter” 
on the keyboard, you add the written sentence to the message. Please note that only 
added sentences will be sent and seen by your partner. The words in the blue input 
line will not be sent. You can always delete previously added sentences by clicking the 
“Clear Input” button. The number of lines you send is not limited. You can therefore 
send messages of any length. You finally send the message to your partner by clicking 
the “Send Message” button.
When you are ready, please click the “Ready” button to start the Test Period.
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S ta r t  P a r t  I
You axe about to start Part I of the experiment. You are now randomly matched with 
a new team partner. For each of the next three rounds you will be matched with a 
new team partner, i. e. in each of the following rounds you will play with a different 
person.
In each round, once all teams’ actions have been taken, the computer will let you 
know which of your final decisions has been chosen randomly as your team’s action. 
It will also let you know all other teams’ decisions, whether your team won the round 
and your personal earnings. In each round, the winning team earns £20 (£10 per 
team player).
Then the next round of the game follows. It will feature an identical task, but you 
will be matched with a new team partner.
Your task is the following:
Your team and all other teams will take their Team ’s A ction  by choosing a 
number between 0 and 100. 0 and 100 are also possible. Only whole numbers will 
be accepted. From all teams’ actions, the computer will calculate the Average. Two 
thirds ( |)  of this average will be your target number. The winning team will be the 
one that is closest to two thirds o f the average. If two or more teams are equally 
close, the prize will be randomly given to one of these teams.
As described earlier, you will send your team partner a Suggested D ecision  
and a M essage. Remember to explain in the message your reasoning behind your 
suggested decision. (And note again that the words in the blue input line will not be 
sent. Press “Enter” to add them to the message.) After this information is exchanged, 
both of you enter your Final Decision, from which the computer randomly chooses 
the Team ’s Action.
When you click the “Ready” button, you will start the first round of Part I of
the experiment.
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S ta r t  P a r t  II
You are about to start Part II of the experiment. You are now randomly matched 
with a new partner. For each of the next four rounds you will be matched with a 
new team partner, i. e. in each of the following rounds you will play with a different 
person.
In this part of the experiment your team will play against only one other team. In 
each of the four rounds you play against a different team. From the four rounds, one 
round is chosen randomly and will be considered for determining the payoff. If your 
team wins this selected round, your team will earn £10 (£5 per team player). Please 
note that you will be informed of your opponent’s team action of the chosen round at 
the end of Part II. There will be no feedback after the individual rounds.
Your task is the following:
In the beginning, the computer will tell you whether your role throughout Part II 
is “H ider” or “Seeker".
If you are H ider , your task is to hide an object behind one of four items. In 
rounds 1 and 2, the object is a Treasure. In rounds 3 and 4, the object is a M ine. 
The hider team wins the round if the treasure was not found by the seeker or if the 
mine was found by the seeker. The seeker does not observe where you hide the object. 
The seeker will look behind one item in each round, not more and not less.
If you are Seeker, your task is to find the treasure in rounds 1 and 2 and to 
avoid the mine in rounds 3 and 4. The seeker team wins the round if it chooses the 
particular item behind which the treasure was hidden or if it chooses an item behind 
which the mine was not hidden.
Just like in Part I, you can send a Suggested D ecision  and an explaining M es­
sage to your team partner. (And note again that the words in the blue input line 
will not be sent. Press “Enter” to add them to the message.) From your two Final 
D ecisions the computer again chooses the Team ’s A ction.
When you click the “Ready” button, you will start the first round of Part II of
the experiment.
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A .5 Classification instructions
It is worthwhile to mention that both RAs had seen the level-m odel in a course on 
Behavioural Game Theory at LSE.
C lassification  P art 1
In the following we will describe the classification process for the analysis of our exper­
iment. We, Konrad and Stefan, assume that you are familiar with the level-m odel 
as it has been introduced by Nagel (1995) or represented by Camerer et al. (2004). 
However, in order to clarify potential questions of terminology, the appendix A.5 
reproduces the main features of the model in the terminology used in this document.
The classification proceeds in two steps, Part 1 and Part 2. You are now provided 
by us with the transcripts for Part 1. The transcripts differ in the amount of informa­
tion about the decisions taken. Only in Part 2 will you see the choices of the players 
that were made.
After your individual classification of each part, you will meet with your co- 
classifier to reconcile your classification. In this process, try to agree on common 
classifications if possible and note them in the third sheet. If an agreement is not 
possible and you keep your initial individual classification, simply note nothing in the 
third sheet. After you finished this process for Part 1, you will hand in the three 
sheets and we will provide you with the material for Part 2. If you have questions 
about the procedure at any point, simply write an email to us and we will clarify any 
point in a mail to both of you.
For Part 1, follow the instructions of this booklet now. Read them entirely to 
get an overview and then start the classification. Please read the messages of each 
player in Period 1 and note for each player the minimum level of reasoning, the level-0 
belief mean and the population distribution. Below you find detailed instructions for 
classifying each player. Please limit yourself to making inferences only from what can 
clearly be derived from the message stated, i. e. do not try  to think about what the 
player might have thought
IM P O R TA N T: When you think that the inform ation  does not clearly 
lend itse lf to any inference, sim ply do not note any classification. Con­
sequently, do not note anything i f  no sta tem en t has been made! I t seem s 
that this tim e the statem ents are less clear than in the fir s t round. Please 
note only those classifications fo r  which you are certain. Make use o f the 
comments space i f  you are not certain but s till want to indicate a feature  
of the reasoning. Sim ilarly, please com m ent i f  the sta tem en t exhibits som e  
argument that does not fit the level-k model as we present it  here.
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Levels: M inim um  lower bounds
For the minimum lower bound on the level of reasoning, you should ask yourself: 
“What is the minimum level of reasoning that this statement clearly exhibits?” Once 
noted, you should be able to say to yourself: “It seems impossible that the players’ 
level of reasoning is below this number!”
Here we ask you to be very cautious with the classification, not giving away high 
levels easily. Please only w rite down the highest lower-bound fo r  which you  
are absolutely certain ! In part 2 you will be asked to classify the maximum lower 
bounds of the level of reasoning. This will be the time to be generous with the 
interpretation of the statements.
Level 0 The player does not exhibit any strategic reasoning whatsoever. Different 
versions of this might be randomly chosen numbers, misunderstanding of the 
game structure or giving other non-strategic ’reasons’ for picking a number, 
e. g. taste. Important is that no best-responding to the others’ play occurs. 
There could be considerations of what others might play, but without best re­
sponding to it. Examples31: “Let’s use 50. This is the average between 0 and 
100.” “I t’s random, so let’s guess something.” “My favourite number is 74.”
Level 1 This player best responds to something (calculates ‘two thirds’). However, 
he does not realise that others will be strategic as well. Example: “They will all 
go for a number of about 50-55. So we should do something like 35.”
Level 2 This player not only best responds (calculating ‘two thirds’), but also realises 
that other players best respond as well. At level 2 the question about the extent 
of strategic reasoning of other players can come up. In the theory, this is reflected 
as a population belief on levels 0 and 1. Example: “Thinking that others play 
60, everybody will play 40. So, we should be more clever and play two thirds 
of 40.” “Some will play just play 90, while others will think and play 60 in 
response. We should therefore play somewhere between 60 and 40.”
Level 3 This player realises that others could be level 2 and reacts by best responding 
to this as well. Put differently, he realises that others realise that others best 
respond as well. As for all players above level 1, the extent of strategic reasoning 
by others is important for level 3 reasoners as well. In addition, they have to 
ask themselves how the level-2 players think about the distribution of level 1 
and level 0 players.
Level 4, 5, ... The process continues to higher levels. More levels of best responses 
and higher orders of beliefs become relevant.
31A11 examples have been made up for illustrative purposes.
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Level 0 belief m ean
If the comment hints toward a value of the mean of the level-0 distribution, then 
indicate this value as level-0 mean. Remember, the level-0 mean is the starting point 
of the reasoning. Players of positive level start best responding on this number. Please 
note a number as level-0 mean only when this number is not logically derived through 
level reasoning or the like. If an interval is indicated, please note the average of the 
lower and upper bound. For example, ‘I think the others play around 50-60.’ can be 
noted as a mean of 55. If only a qualitative statement is made about the level-0 mean, 
try to quantify it if possible. Otherwise, please write a short comment that indicates 
what is written down. Similarly, if a distribution is specified, please comment precisely 
on the relevant passage.
The literature usually assumes a mean of 50. Be reminded that this is only a 
common assumption which should not influence your considerations at this point.
P opu la tion  belief
The population belief distribution gk(h) of a player of level k gives the fraction in the 
population he expects to be of level h. By definition, for level 0 players, the population 
belief is irrelevant. Level 1 players are defined as believing that all others are level 0. 
Hence, differences in the population belief distribution can only show up for players 
who are level 2 or higher. Therefore, we do not expect any statement from you for 
reasoners below level 2. But even if the level is 2 or higher, be reminded that at points 
where you think the information does not lend itself to any inference, simply do not 
note any classification.
We want to distinguish two sorts of population beliefs, distinguished by the de­
generateness of the population distribution.
D egenerate Under a degenerate population belief, a player believes that all other 
players reason exactly one level below themselves. A level 5 player believes 
everybody else to be level 4. Higher order beliefs are also degenerate. So a level 
3 player would think that all others (who are believed to be level 2 players) will 
believe that all others are level 1 and so on. Example: “Thinking that others 
play 60, everybody will play 40. So, we should be more clever and play two 
thirds of 40.” 32
N on-degenerate  A non-degenerate population belief gives non-zero probability to 
more than one lower level. In such a case, a level 2 player believes that both 
level 0 and level 1 subjects are in the game with positive probability. Higher 
order beliefs could be either degenerate or non-degenerate. An example would 
be: “Some will play just play 90, while others will think and play 60 in response. 
We should therefore play somewhere between 60 and 40.” (In the unlikely case,
32Nagel (1995) proposed such a population belief.
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that the population belief is of the ‘degenerate’ type but some higher order 
beliefs are not, please make a note.)33
M odel and term in ology
The level-/c model of bounded rationality assumes that players only think through a 
certain number (k) of best responses. The model has four main ingredients:
P opu la tion  d is trib u tio n  This distribution on INo reflects the proportion of types 
with a certain level k.
Level-0 d is trib u tio n  By definition, a level-0 player does not best respond. Hence, 
his actions are random to the game and distributed over the action space, which 
in our case is A  = {{0}, {1}, {2}, . . . ,  {99}, {100}}.
Level-0 belief In the model, players with k > 0 best respond to what they believe 
the level-0 players play. Their level-0 belief might not be consistent with the 
level-0 distribution. For best responding, all that matters of the level-0 belief 
is the mean, which lies in [0,100]. It is frequently assumed that the level-0 
distribution and the level-0 belief are consistent, but for the classification this is 
irrelevant.
P opu la tion  belief Players do not expect other players to be of the same or a higher 
level of reasoning. For a level-A: player, the population belief is therefore defined 
on the set of levels strictly below k. It follows that level-0 players have no 
defined belief, level-1 players have a trivial belief with full probability mass on 
{0}, level-2 players have a well defined belief on {{0}, {1}}. From level 3 higher 
order beliefs are relevant as level-3 players have to form a belief about level-2’s 
beliefs.
C lassification  Part 2
The classification proceeds in two steps, Part 1 and Part 2. You are now provided by 
us with the transcripts for Part 2. You can now see the choices of the players that 
were made.
Please consider the information on each player in Period 1 and note for each 
player the maximum lower bound of level of reasoning and whether the equilibrium 
has been identified and whether dominance reasoning has been applied in the excel 
sheet provided. Below you find detailed instructions for classifying each player. Please 
limit yourself to making inferences only from what can clearly be derived from the 
message and the action data, i. e. do not try to think about what the player might 
have thought.
33Camerer et al. (2004) proposed a truncated Poisson distribution as population belief distribution.
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Be rem inded that when you think that the inform ation  does not clearly 
lend itse lf to  any inference, sim ply do not note any classification. Con­
sequently, do not note anything i f  no sta tem ent has been made! I t seems 
that this tim e the sta tem en ts are less clear than in the firs t round. Please 
note only those classifications fo r  which you are certain. Make use o f  the 
com m ents space i f  you are not certain but s till want to indicate a feature  
o f the reasoning. Sim ilarly, please com m ent i f  the sta tem en t exhibits som e  
argument that does not f it  the level-k model as we presen t it  here.
Levels: Upper bounds
The upper bounds should give the maximum level of reasoning that could be inter­
preted into the statement. Therefore, you should ask yourself: “What is the highest 
level of reasoning that can be underlying this statement?” Once noted, you should be 
able to say: “Although maybe not clearly communicated, this statement could be an 
expression of this level. If the player reasoned higher than this number, this was not 
expressed in the statement!”
Please refer to the level characterisations in Part 1 of the instructions.
Type: Equilibrium identification
With this dummy, you indicate whether the player realised that the unique equilibrium 
is 0. For this he has to mention the equilibrium action 0. It is not enough to describe 
a process of downward convergence. The equilibrium might be mentioned anywhere 
in the statement, so it is irrelevant whether he stops reasoning when he found the 
equilibrium strategies or whether finds further arguments not to play 0. People will 
not necessarily use the word ‘equilibrium’, but they might describe that ‘theoretically 
everybody should play 0’ or that ‘the process will be going down to O’.
Set the dummy to 0 if the equilibrium was not identified and to 1 if it was.
Type: Dominance reasoning
With this dummy, you indicate whether the reasoning applied the concept of domi­
nance for the explanation. This is defined as involving iterative deletion of dominated 
strategies and randomly playing one of the remaining actions or best responding to 
a distribution over the partner’s remaining action space. People will not necessarily 
use the word ‘dominance’, but they might describe that ‘playing above 66 makes no 
sense’. Note that ‘everybody plays on average 50 so I should not play higher than 34’ 
is not a dominance reasoning, because it rules out strategies based on a distribution 
on the full action space. Dominance reasoning rules out first and plays a best response 
then.
Set the dummy to 1 if dominance was used in the argument and to 0 if it was not.
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2 Estim ating the level-A; model: 
the ‘hide and seek’ game
2.1 In trodu ction
The level- k model of reasoning has so far proven to be the most successful model 
in explaining experimental data on strategic interaction. In particular, it usually 
provides a framework that reflects the nature of individuals’ strategic thinking in 
one-shot games better than the Nash equilibrium concept. Its structure consists of a 
level-0 player that is assumed to play randomly, truthfully, or according to salience 
depending on the situation at hand. Level-1 players play one best response to what 
they believe a level-0 player will do. Higher level reasoners play iterated best responses 
to expected lower level play.
This structure is very versatile in explaining data, but the flexibility is also a 
major disadvantage for a scientific model that wants to be used for predictions. The 
most fluid element in the model is the level-0 belief, which is also the most important 
ingredient of the model. If it is desirable to avoid the “circular concept” of equilibrium 
(Selten, 1998, p. 421), where the starting point of reasoning is given by the correct 
belief about the action of the opponent, another belief structure has to be defined. I 
think that it is necessary to let the model assumptions be guided by the actual beliefs 
exhibited by individuals.
In order to investigate this crucial starting point empirically, this chapter applies 
the novel experimental design which was introduced in the first chapter of this thesis. 
It obtains insights in the level reasoning by making use of the transcripts from intra­
team communication. In particular, teams of 2 players are playing together as one 
entity. Each team member can initially send a so-called ‘suggested decision’ and a 
justifying ‘message’ to her team partner in order to explain her arguments. She has 
an incentive to do so because after the simultaneous exchange of their messages, both 
players give -  again individually -  a ‘final decision’, of which one is chosen randomly 
by the computer to be the ‘team’s action’ in the game.
The reasoning that is revealed in the communication transcripts is new evidence 
for level-reasoning in the ‘hide and seek’ game, a zero-sum game with a unique mixed 
strategy Nash-equilibrium. Rubinstein and Tversky (1993) introduced this game in 
which the hider team hides a treasure which is sought by the seeker. Whoever possesses 
the object at the end of the game wins a prize. The four possible locations are labeled 
ABAA. Faced with this strategic situation, players indeed hypothesise an intuitive 
reaction of one type of player and iterate best replies until they get to a prescription of 
play for themselves. The framing induces level-0 beliefs of non-random play, making 
it worthwhile to engage in level reasoning.
The communication transcripts are classified by two research assistants along the
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lines of a very general level-A; model. This classification is able to provide bounds on 
most of the individuals’ level of reasoning and also gives rich insights in the level-0 
beliefs of the players. To make optimal use of it, this information is subsequently used 
as constraints in a maximum likelihood estimation. Using this experimental design 
for the ‘hide and seek’ game enables me to investigate the influence of salience on 
the level-0 belief as well as potential differences in the reasoning of the two types of 
players, hider and seeker. Furthermore, for the expected reactions to the salience it 
might be relevant which type is thought about in the level-0 belief.
As a first result on the nature of the level-0 belief, I find that more than half of 
the classified players have a J5-frame in the sense that they perceive the differences in 
the locations through the different letters. Less than a fifth of the classified players 
partition the locations in middle- and endpoints. Other partitions are rare.
Whether the level-0 belief states an attraction or aversion to the B  depends on 
which type of player is thought about. If the hider is subject of the level-0 belief, she 
is thought to avoid the salient B. If a seeker is though about, he is mostly expected 
to be attracted by the B. Interestingly, if the middle- vs. endpoints are differentiated, 
both hiders and seekers are believed to be attracted by the middle locations.
The average level of reasoning is found to be higher for seekers. However, the 
fraction of non-strategic level-0 players is the same for both types. The difference in 
average level is due to the fact that there are more level-1 hiders than level-1 seekers 
and more level-2 seekers than level-2 hiders. The level-distribution for seekers is flat 
for levels 0 until 2. Interestingly, the reason for this result can be found in the level-0 
belief. It can be seen that more players start their reasoning by thinking about a
seeker, implying that this is somehow easier or more intuitive.
Since the same subjects played both a ‘beauty contest’ game -  as analysed in chap­
ter 1 -  and this ‘hide and seek’ game, it is possible to do a within-subject comparison 
of the level estimates. I find that there is no positive correlation across games neither 
between levels nor between upper or lower bounds. Controlling for the type of player 
in the ‘hide and seek’ game does not change this result.
Six of the 8 sessions of the ‘hide and seek’ game were played with a preceding
round of a repeated ‘beauty contest’ game. Comparing the level estimates in those 
sessions with the ones in the sessions where only the ‘hide and seek’ was played, it can 
be seen that the prior play of the ‘beauty contest’ increases the level of reasoning in 
the subsequent ‘hide and seek’ game. This result raises the question to which extent 
previous experimental experience of subjects biases results in subsequent experiments.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the level-A; model in the 
context of non-neutral framing and reviews the related literature on the ‘hide and seek’ 
game. Section 2.3 presents the experimental design and the classification procedure, 
before section 2.4 gives the results that follow immediately from the classification. 
Finally, section 2.5 describes the estimation procedure and gives the resulting findings 
before the final section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Focality  and th e  level-fc m odel
‘Hide and seek’ games have been studied by economists since the early days of game 
theory (von Neumann, 1953). The class of zero-sum games was the first for which 
the theory established precise predictions. Empirical tests of the minimax solution 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) or of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
prediction had at some point to face the fact that game theory’s abstraction from 
labelling led to poor predictions. O’Neill (1987) mentioned that the use of the ‘ace’ in 
his card experiment alongside the cards ‘two’ and ‘three’ “may have been a mistake” 
since “players were attracted by the powerful connotations of an ace” (p. 2108), playing 
it more frequently although the game structure treated the three cards equally. The 
‘hide and seek’ game by Rubinstein and Tversky (1993) with the A B A A  framing made 
this notion of influence explicit and led to striking results that did not conform with 
the predictions of game theory.
The relevance of focal points has first been highlighted by Schelling (1960, p. 57), 
who mentioned that they provide a clue “for each person’s expectation of what the 
other expects him to expect to be expected to do” . In the study by Mehta, Starmer 
and Sugden (1994) the notion of salience was put under experimental scrutiny. While 
many factors play a role in defining what can be focal in a specific situation, the 
required “uniqueness in some conspicuous respect” (Lewis, 1969, p. 35) led Bacharach 
(1993) to theorise how focality can enter game theory.
In an initially unrelated field of study, Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995) 
introduced a model of level of reasoning in order to explain experimental data that did 
not conform with equilibrium, but which still exhibited patterns of strategic reasoning. 
In this model, a so-called ‘level-0’ reasoner plays non-strategically a random action. 
A ‘level-1’ reasoner plays a best response to this action, assuming that everybody 
else is a level-0 player. Iteratively, higher level reasoners play best responses to the 
play of lower level players. A level-2 player needs to form a belief about the relative 
frequency of level-0 and level-1 players in the population in order to best-respond. 
This population belief is non-trivial for all levels above level-1.
It can be seen that the level-0 action plays the important role of a starting point 
for the iterative best responses. The non-strategic nature of this kind of play led 
Bacharach and Stahl (1997; 2000) to incorporate Bacharach’s ideas of focality into the 
level-0 of a level-/c model of reasoning. In the basic theory of focality by Bacharach 
(1993), a frame consists of one or more classifiers of objects that the player per­
ceives. Each classifier induces a partition of the action space. For example, the 
letter classifier for a set of actions A  = {A i,B 2 , As, A*} would induce a partition 
Pi —  {{M,Az,A±},{B2}}.
Bringing this to the level-fc model, the non-strategic, frame-induced play of a level- 
0 player results from uniform randomisation first over the cells in the partition and 
then over the objects in the cell. For the action space A  in this example this would
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give the probabilities as in table 2.1. This way, the salience of the B  can be captured 
in terms of probabilities. The intuitive reaction to the framing enters the level-0 and 
provides a starting point for level reasoning.
A\ b 2 A3 A4. r .. " 1 ” “1 ' 1
6 2 6 6
Table 2 .1: Probabilities under Pi = {{Ai, .A3, A4}, {#2}}.
Apart from the innovations in the level-0 play, the level-A: model of Bacharach and 
Stahl (2000) is based on the model of Stahl and Wilson (1995), featuring a probabilistic 
best response with probabilities of playing a particular action that increase in the 
expected payoffs from this choice. The population beliefs of high level players are 
potentially non-degenerate, implying that a level-A: player does not only believe level- 
(k — 1) players to be axound, but a mixture of lower level players. In Bacharach and 
Stahl (1997), a simplified version of the ‘hide and seek’ games of Rubinstein et al. 
(1996) is investigated theoretically from this theory’s perspective. It should be noted 
that Bacharach and Stahl do not assume that the probabilities as given in table 2.1 
apply across tasks. They rather assume the seeker to be attracted to the B  while the 
hiders would intuitively avoid the B.
Another level-A; model of framing, in the following proposed by Crawford and 
Iriberri (2007a), assumes that the level-0 play is symmetric across types of players. 
The underlying structure of the level-A; model follows closely the models of Costa- 
Gomes et al. (2001; 2006) in that it assumes degenerate population beliefs and optimal 
responses. Furthermore, for econometric purposes, it is assumed that the level-0 player 
only exists in the heads of higher level players.
Like the earlier study presented in chapter 1, the current study aims to illuminate 
the adequateness of the assumptions made in these two models. Therefore, I propose 
a general model that does not make any symmetry or asymmetry assumption in the 
level-0 beliefs or level distribution and that does not restrict the population beliefs. 
The general framework only assumes that players iteratively best respond to the other 
players which are always believed to stop their iteration earlier than oneself. Of course, 
different kinds of reasoning, like equilibrium or sophisticated reasoning can also be 
expected and should be allowed for.34 The nature of reasoning shall be investigated 
empirically in this study.
The study of Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) was the first to bring the level-A; model 
with framing to the data, using the aggregate action data of studies by Rubinstein et al. 
(1993; 1996; 1999). While the action data shows a pattern that suggests some strategic 
non-equilibrium thinking, it is not clear that level-A; is the appropriate model. The 
data used is rather coarse and does not allow to infer the underlying type of reasoning. 
To my knowledge, the original studies were not accompanied by questionnaires which
34Note that dominance reasoning is excluded from this list since one can reasonably expect this not 
to arise.
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could have indicated the underlying kind of reasoning.
In other games, like the ‘beauty contest’, more evidence of level-A: reasoning has 
been gathered. Due to the particular game structure, it is possible to associate some 
actions with particular levels (Nagel, 1995). More qualitative insights have been ob­
tained through questionnaires that were handed out after the experiment, suggesting 
that level reasoning is applied (Nagel, 1994; Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002). The loose 
connection of the comments in the questionnaires with the undertaken reasoning, 
however, stood in the way to use this data more rigorously.
The mentioned connection between actions and levels allowed Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford (2006) to use action data from a repeated ‘beauty contest’ in order to in­
vestigate the presence of particular types of reasoners. Since actions in the ‘hide and 
seek’ game do not allow for conclusions on levels and since response patterns to fo­
cality might be fragile, fingerprints of repeated games would not help the analysis in 
this case.
The experimental design that was proposed in the first chapter for investigating 
the ‘beauty contest’ is versatile enough to be of help in this setting. It uses a team- 
setup, providing communication transcripts that allow for inferences on the individual 
player’s type of reasoning. Given the non-informativeness of the action for inferring 
the level of reasoning, the key feature of the design is that it does not only look for the 
level of reasoning in the actions, but rather in the communication statements, which 
are a natural and reliable mirror of the underlying reasoning.35
2.3 E xperim en t design
The experiment was conducted in 8 sessions in the Experimental Economics Labora­
tory of the Department of Economics in Royal Holloway (University of London).
2.3.1 Overall structure
The 114 participants were mainly undergraduate students in Royal Holloway. 18-20 
students were invited per session. Since some students did not show up, the highest 
possible even number of students was allowed in the laboratory. The ‘hide and seek’ 
game did not differ across the 8 sessions. However, 6 of the 8 sessions were organised 
such that a three-period ‘beauty contest’ game was played before the ‘hide and seek’ 
game. In all sessions, the number of participants was 12, 14 or 16.36
The ‘hide and seek’ game played was identical to the original games played in 
Rubinstein and Tversky (1993). The hiders had to hide an object in one of four 
locations, winning a prize in case the seekers did not find it. The seekers won the 
prize when they found the object. The object was a treasure and the four locations
35For a detailed discussion of related research methodologies, advantages and disadvantages of the 
design as well as its performance in a different game, see section 1.3.
36In the session with 14 participants, one of the seeker teams’ decision was used for two hider teams.
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were labeled A B A A 3 7  The participants of the experiment were paid a show-up fee of 
£5. The winning team won a prize of £10 (£5 per team player).
Participants were randomly assigned into teams of 2 players. The two members 
were connected through the chat module of the experiment software.38 The team 
setup was essential to the investigation of the individuals’ reasoning. The same com­
munication structure as in the first chapter was used here, see section 1.4 and figure 
1 .1 .
2.3.2 Classification of communication transcripts
In order to make use of the communication transcripts in a rigorous way it is necessary 
to code the players’ statements. I asked two research assistants to classify the messages 
along the lines of the general level-/c model outlined in section 2.2, following a cautious 
approach.
The two Ph.D. students from the Department of Economics at LSE were given 
all players’ messages and suggested decisions and the instructions that I wrote after 
having seen the communication transcripts myself.39 The instructions that are repro­
duced in appendix B.5 were self-contained and not complemented by verbal comments. 
Questions of the research assistants were addressed via an e-mail list that included 
all three of us. The two RAs individually classified the messages and then met to 
reconcile their classifications and to produce one joint classification which they both 
agreed upon, if possible.
The three model parameters of interest were the level of reasoning, the level-0 
belief and the equilibrium identification. The statements indicate that many players 
assume a particular reaction of one type of player and iterate best replies until they 
get a prescription of play for themselves. Prom the outset it might seem very difficult 
to disentangle an intuitive reaction to the salience of a player on the one side and the 
following steps of best responses on the other side. After all, the main point of both 
kinds of considerations will be the same, they will advocate the choice of a particular 
location due to attraction or aversion of the opponent to some locations. What comes 
across as an intuitively expected reaction in the message might be the result of a 
non-stated best-response consideration. However, the experimental design provides 
incentives for the subjects to be as convincing as possible, and therefore to state all 
steps of reasoning explicitly. The following examples should give an idea to which 
extent the statements risk to omit explicitly made steps of reasoning.
37Four rounds without feedback were played. In the second round, the labels were ‘1234’. In rounds 
3 and 4 the object was a mine, reversing the roles of the players. Round 3 has the A B A A  labels and 
round 4 the ‘1234’ ones. One of the four rounds was chosen randomly to determine of the payoffs. 
In this study, I will restrict attention to the first round. The later periods will be subject of further 
research in the future.
38The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
39 As opposed to the ‘beauty contest’ game, there is no ex-ante association of actions with particular 
levels in the ‘hide and seek’ game. Therefore, it was innocuous to provide the action data at the same 
time as the messages.
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Seeker: “im guessing i t ’s a bluff, so am picking randomly” (Proposal: A 4 )
Hider: “i think hide item behind the b is dangerous, it is distinguish so the 
seeker team must open the b. so i choose the last a box. ” (Proposal: A \ )
Seeker: “people usually choose the ones in the middle..so i think the hider 
has put somewhere else other than in the middle?” (Proposal: A\)
Hider: “i think that the other team will think that we have hidden it behind 
an ’a ’ block as there is more of them, so we wouldnt put it behind the 
obvious b block by itself” (Proposal: B )
For the reasons indicated above and due to the ambiguity of common language 
and uncertainties in the composition of the messages, one cannot expect a precise 
identification of the level of reasoning from the communication. In order to still extract 
as much information as cautiously possible from the messages, I asked the RAs to state 
a lower bound and an upper bound for the level of reasoning.40 The lower bound was 
defined to be the lowest level of reasoning that the statement clearly exhibits, in the 
sense that any lower level could be excluded on the basis of the statement. The upper 
bound gives the maximum level of reasoning that could possibly be interpreted into 
the statement. These definitions were chosen in order to exclude only levels that were 
either clearly surpassed or that were surely not stated in the message. To account for 
the subtleties connected with the classification of the upper bounds, which involve the 
difficult distinction between instinctive level-0 beliefs and explicit steps of reasoning, 
the econometric results in section 2.5 are checked for robustness by running estimations 
without using the information on the upper bounds.
If level reasoning is observed, the level-0 belief characterises the starting point of 
the argument. It consists of what type of player is thought about and what salient 
location this player is expected to be attracted or averse to. The most relevant location 
in a player’s level-0 belief is the one that is believed to be most or least attractive to 
the hider or seeker that the player has in mind. She will emphasise this in the message 
and hence this prominent location will often be the major piece of information that is 
extractable in the classification. In terms of the model, the most attractive location 
is reflected by having the highest probability of being chosen among the 4 locations. 
From the statement, one can only expect to get an ordinal ranking of the locations in 
terms of their attractiveness.
The classifiers were asked to give such a ranking over the four locations using a 
‘more attractive than’ relation. With the locations represented by their position from 
left to right as ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’, a B  attraction would be coded as 2 > 134. This 
way of coding allows for a very rich representation of the individuals’ level-0 beliefs
40If two differing classifications were provided, the minimum between the two RAs’ classification 
would be used for the lower bound and the maximum for the upper bound.
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which can afterwards be grouped into relevant categories according to the analysis’s 
needs.
Note that a ranking was given explicitly for each level of reasoning between the 
lower and the upper bound. This is because a certain suggested decision can be 
justified by a pair of level and level-0 belief. To see this, imagine a seeker that sought 
at B  and that is classified to be either level-1 or level-2. As a level-1 player she is 
classified to exhibit a level-0 belief of B  attraction of a hider. Her play of the B  will 
be justified differently if she is assumed to be level-2. In this case she would have 
thought about a seeker that is averse to the B  in her level-0 belief, which made the 
hider best-respond by playing the B. It can be seen from this example that the level-0 
belief changes with the level in a mechanical way. This happens since, for the same 
action, the level-0 belief for a hypothesised level-1 player is the best response to the 
level-0 belief of a level-2 player. Furthermore, the type of player that the belief is 
about alternates in the level. Seekers, for example, have a level-0 belief about hiders 
at odd levels 1, 3, 5, etc., and about seekers at even levels 2, 4, 6, etc. Table 2.8 
exhibits this connection in a possibly more approachable fashion and shows how level 
and level-0 belief comove. Although the RAs gave a ranking for each possible level, 
the comovement was always exhibited in their ranking as described here.
The final parameter of interest is an indicator for equilibrium play. This was in­
troduced to distinguish between random level-0 play and random equilibrium play. 
The indicator reflects that the player gives arguments for his random play by men­
tioning that any location is a best response to random play, which distinguishes an 
equilibrium player from a level-0 player.
For smaller details of the level-fc model, I instructed the RAs to indicate reasoning 
characteristics in the form of optional comments. I explicitly asked them to comment 
on any form of a non-degenerate population belief. Similarly, I asked them to make 
a comment if a participant reached a level in which the reasoning comes to the same 
action prescription as level-1, i.e. it reaches a cycling phase. This would be a player 
who could potentially reach an argument for randomising over strategies of level-1 to 
level-5 by observing that all that matters is whether the opponent stops reasoning at 
just one level below him in this cycle.41 Identifying this meta-coordination game is the 
closest that level reasoning can get to uniform randomisation as in the mixed strat­
egy equilibrium. The randomisation over the strategies is, however, not necessarily 
uniform random.
The two research assistants had only a few minor discrepancies in their judgements 
and all data that is used was exclusively agreed upon by them.
41That is, if he is reasoning under a degenerate population belief as hypothesised in Crawford and 
Iriberri (2007a).
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2.4 Results
This section presents the data on the suggested decisions and the results of the clas­
sification. Initially, the background of the students will be summarised.
2.4.1 D escrip tive d a ta
A total number of 114 students participated in the sessions, all of which were recruited 
by the host institution. Of the 21 economics students that participated, 16 were in 
their first year, 3 in the second year, 1 in the third year, and 1 was a PhD student. 
19 students had received training in game theory and 12 had been confronted with 
the ‘hide and seek’ game before. The majority of participants had taken part in 
an experiment before. Table 2.2 and table 2.3 summarise some of the participants’ 
background characteristics.
Table 2.2: Players’ background.
Field of Study Economics
21
Other
91
NA
2
Degree Bachelors Masters Ph.D. Other
83 15 6 10
Year in Degree 1 st 2 nd 3rd 4 th or more
75 20 12 7
Gender female male
56 58
Age Mean
21.19
Table 2.3: Players’ prior training.
No Yes
Game theory training 95 19
Prior experiment participation 32 82
Hide and seek experience 102 12
The action data is summarised in figures 2.1 and 2.2. It can be compared to the 
aggregate data used in Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) depicted in figures 2.3 and 2.4.
In the latter figures it can be seen that, irrespective of the type of the players, 
a majority plays action 3, the central A3, while the other positions are chosen with 
roughly the same probability.42 This regularity only holds for the seekers in my data. 
Most of the hiders in my study suggest the last position, the right end A 4 , generally 
avoiding the B. In the following sections the communication data will be described, 
allowing for a look at the reasoning structures underlying these choices.
42Appendix B.2 shows that the disaggregated data for other treasure games with A B A A  labels 
exhibits roughly the same regularity.
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Suggested decision Period 1 Hider Suggested decision Penot^Seeker
Suggested D ecision
Figure 2.1: Hiders’ suggested 
decisions (N=60).
Suggested  Decision
Figure 2.2: Seekers’ suggested 
decisions (N=54).
Action Hider Action Seeker
Figure 2.3: 624 Hiders, aggregate as 
in Crawford and Iriberri (2007a).
F igure 2.4: 560 Seekers, aggregate 
as in Crawford and Iriberri (2007a).
2.4.2 C om m unication inform ation
The classification asked for three pieces of information: the level of reasoning, the level- 
0 belief and whether equilibrium reasoning was employed. The following paragraphs 
present the findings one by one.
Level of reasoning Table 2.4 presents the classification information in terms of the 
lower and upper bounds on the level of reasoning. For 96 of the 114 subjects, both a 
lower and an upper bound was stated. 2 hiders identified the equilibrium by making 
an argument for random play as the best response to random play. For one participant 
only a lower bound was indicated. The messages of the remaining 15 subjects did not 
allow for an identification of the level interval.
For 57 participants the level of reasoning was fully determined, for 36 it was 
possible to restrict the set of possible levels to 2 and only for 3 a total of 3 levels 
were considered to be in accordance with the message. Both the lower and the upper 
bounds’ distributions are hump shaped, as one expects in a homogenous population. 
If the upper bound was identified, it was never set higher than 4. This implies that 
no participant reached the phase in which the argumentation would start cycling, as 
a level-5 reasoner comes to the same conclusion as a level-1 reasoner.43
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the information by task. It can be seen that both types’
43Furthermore, no written comment was given by the RAs that indicated the presence of cycling.
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Table 2.4: Level classification results.
62
Level Upper Bounds (0  1.29)
0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 22 14 0 0 0 36
Level Lower Bounds 1 21 17 0 0 38
(0  0.86) 2 12 5 3 20
3 1 0 1
4 1 1
Total 22 35 29 6 4 96
messages lend themselves to a classification with the same probability («  85%). For 
both the lower and the upper bounds, the average is higher for the seekers. An 
interesting detail is that the lower and upper bounds are not hump-shaped for the 
seekers as opposed to the hiders. The fact that the seekers have two peaks at level- 
0 and level-2 and the hiders at level-1 suggests that the reasoning often starts by 
considering what the intuitive reaction of a seeker is. Both of these points shall be 
investigated in more detail in the estimation section.
Table 2.5: Level classification of hiders.
60 Hiders Level Upper Bounds (0  1.22)
0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 9 6 0 0 0 15
Level Lower Bounds 1 19 8 0 0 27
(0  0.82) 2 2 2 2 6
3 1 0 1
4 0 0
Total 9 25 10 3 2 49
Table 2.6: Level classification of seekers.
54 Seekers Level Upper Bounds (0  1.38)
0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 13 8 0 0 0 21
Level Lower Bounds 1 2 9 0 0 11
(0  0.91) 2 10 3 1 14
3 0 0 0
4 1 1
Total 13 10 19 3 2 47
Level-0 B elief Of the 96 participants with a classified level interval, for 74 it was 
possible to obtain a ranking of attraction for the starting point of the level reasoning, 
the level-0 belief. 22 subjects with a level classification could not be given a ranking of 
attraction since they were identified as level-0 reasoners that did not react explicitly 
to the framing in the message.
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Once these rankings are available, one can group them according to key character­
istics. Natural groupings would be beliefs that exhibit a 5-frame, an endpoint-frame 
or a central ^ 3-attention.44 For the sake of completeness, the list of relevant attention 
patterns is amended by Ai-attention and ^-attention. Other frames outside this 
partition are found in only one case. Table 2.7 shows the overall and the type-specific 
frequencies of the various types of frames.
Table 2.7: Belief classification results.
Frame 5 M A3 Ai a 4 0 E
Hiders 27 7 1 2 2 1 40
Seekers 21 7 4 1 1 0 34
Total 48 14 5 3 3 1 74
It can be seen that the vast majority of 48 players pays attention to the 52-frame 
(75%). 14 (19%) divide the locations into middle- and endpoints. The A 3 frame 
is quite rare, it might be occurring because the player omitted to state the initial 
salience of 5  and the endpoints that made him consider the central A 3 . All As are 
considered salient in very few cases only. One hider exhibited a frame that showed 
an equal attraction both to 5  and to A4, which was not categorised (0 ). Two types 
of attentions are considered, attraction and aversion. Note that one can say from the 
classification whether an attraction or an aversion was exhibited. However, this would 
be connected to a certain level of reasoning, since for a given action, the justifying 
level-0 belief changes with the level as outlined in section 2.3.2. I will only be able 
to investigate patterns of attractions and aversions once the levels are estimated in 
section 2.5. In table 2.7 it can be seen that the relative frequency of the frames are 
indeed very similar across types.45
Suggested decision of LO hiders (classified) Suggested decision of LO seekers (classified)
Suggested D ecision 3 4  0 1 Suggested D ecision 3
Figure 2.5: Suggested decisions of 9 Figure 2.6: Suggested decisions of 
level-0 hiders. 13 level-0 seekers.
44To give an example, a B -frame would be the one where the second location was either the highest 
or the lowest ranked position. Whether it is highest or lowest determines the type of the attention, 
attraction or aversion.
45There is a small difference in that the seekers exhibit more ^ 3 -frames. If one takes the stance 
that the ^ 3 -frame is the opposite of a B-frame in the sense that the very first reaction to the B  was 
not written down, the frequencies would match even better.
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Level-0 A ctions After considering the intuitive reactions to the framing of the 
locations, it is possible to check whether the level-0 players indeed follow the frames 
as in the level-0 belief. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show that level-0 hiders seem to be 
attracted to A4, avoiding the B , while seekers choose mostly B. However, the number 
of datapoints is limited to 9 hiders and 13 seekers, so that the result is not more 
than indicative. Note that for the hiders, A 4  is the mode of all players’ suggested 
decisions. For the seekers, the level-0 mode with B  is different to the mode of As 
for the seekers. Whether the attraction/aversion patterns of the beliefs are consistent 
with these actions will be investigated in section 2.5.2.
2.5 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The previous section showed that the communication transcripts themselves allow to 
obtain ample information about the players’ reasoning. However, I can now go a step 
further and obtain a distribution of players’ levels in terms of point estimates rather 
then classification intervals. This will finally allow me to indicate whether attraction 
or aversion prevails for the individual level-0 frames found in the classification and 
which type of player, hider or seeker, is this attraction or aversion attributed to. For 
this purpose, section 2.5.1 introduces an econometric model and section 2.5.2 presents 
the estimation results.
2.5.1 A n Econom etric  M odel
In the maximum likelihood estimation, I want to use all information from the classifica­
tion about the individual’s reasoning to estimate f*, the parameter of the type-specific 
Poisson level distribution V'ik^T1). Note that I allow for two separate distribution 
parameters in order to investigate level distributions that differ between hiders and 
seekers.
In addition, r* a is estimated, the probability that types t G {hider, seeker} are be­
lieved to exhibit attention a G {attraction, aversion} to frame c G {B, M, A3, Ai, A4}.46 
Since they are considered by type and frame, it has to be that r* att +  rlcav = 1 V t, c. 
The available information is the sequence of actions {ai}£Li and the sequence of frames 
{ c i} ^  from the classification. Also, the lower bound of level reasoning k and the 
upper bound of level reasoning k will be used. Since actions are independent, the 
log-likelihood function is:
N
L(rt» rtc,a\ M id i {Ci}£l) = loS^(rt» r c,a; a i, d ) ,
i= 1
46 Since it is not possible to estimate without a given frame, the 1 observation with frame 0  cannot 
enter this estimation.
2 THE ‘HIDE AND SEEK’ GAME 65
k 0 1 2 3 4 constraint
Level 0 B  av. B  av. B  at. B  at. B  av.
belief on S H S H S
Level 0 B  av. B  av. B  at. B  at. B  av. lb = 1, ub = 2
belief on S H S H S
Table 2.8: The way level, action and frame determine the attention is reflected in
h(fc,  q , d j ) .
where
= max / ' f t r ' )
{(fc,c,a)|fce[fc,A;]}
The structure of the level-fc model is taken into account as follows: The action a; 
of a player with frame q  determines the frame attention for the level. For example, a 
seeker playing A 3  and having a B  frame exhibits a =  {aversion} if she was a level-0 
player. The likelihood contribution from such a player would then be
Is (0 \Ts)-r%iav.
However, the same action could be justified with the seeker being level-1 reasoner 
and having a level-0 belief on a hider that is averse to the B:
m r s)-rhBth air
Similar to the estimation in the first chapter, the maximisation in the ^-function 
can be controversial. As before, an alternative approach is a mixture model which 
maintains the structure of having a certain probability of facing a level-k player. The 
log-likelihood function would be reflected by
i=l \k=k J
Again, it is assumed that such an estimation would not lead to different results. 
The first line of table 2.8 shows the pattern that emerges for higher levels. The 
second line shows how the imposition of the lower and upper bounds puts restricting 
constraints on the estimation.
2.5.2 E stim ation  R esults
Since the individual frames q  enter the estimation as inputs, only those 74 subjects’ 
levels can be estimated that were given a level-0 frame in the classification. The one 
player whose level-0 belief could not be categorised in the standard frames was not
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considered in this estimation.
The estimation results presented in the following do not impose symmetry between 
hiders and seekers at any point. The level distributions are specific to the types of the 
players. The attraction/aversion probabilities are specific to the types that the level-0 
belief is about. Symmetric constellations are then nested and the estimation hence 
allows to discriminate between various assumptions on symmetries in the literature. 
Furthermore, the estimation presented will impose both the lower and upper bound.47
Level d istribu tion  A first important estimate is the level parameter and the result­
ing distribution of levels. The average level is differing between types, with Th = 0.92 
and t s = 1.11. Table 2.9 shows the resulting overall distribution of types of reasoning. 
It shows that it is hump-shaped as expected and similar to the findings in chapter 1 
and (Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006, CGC).
Table 2.9: Estimated overall level distribution.
‘Hide and seek’ ‘Beauty contest’ CGC
LO 30 (26.3%) 30 (35.7%) -
LI 40 (35.1%) 37 (44.0%) 27 (30.7%)
L2 20 (17.5%) 12 (14.3%) 17 (19.3%)
L3 4 (3.5%) 1 (1.2%) 1 (i.i% )
L4 1 (0.9%) - -
D1 - 2 (2.4%) 1 (i.i%)
S2 - 1 (1.2%) 1° (i.i%)
E 2 (1.8%) 1 (1.2%) 11 (12.5%)
n.c. 17 (14.9%) - 30 (34.1%)
N 114 84 88
a ‘Sophisticated’ without level indication.
Estimated level distribution Estimated level distribution
Figure 2.7: Hiders’ estimated level F igure 2.8: Seekers’ estimated level 
distribution. distribution.
Rubinstein et al. (1996) hypothesise that the seeker has a psychological advantage 
because he should be regarded as ‘responding’ to the hider, having thus naturally an 
easier access to strategic considerations. By looking at the level estimates by types,
47Appendix B.3 presents results of an estimation that does not impose upper bounds.
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Table 2.10: Who is subject of the level-0 belief?
L0 belief
L0 belief frame on seekers on hiders Total
Total 44 29 73
I can check whether this hypothesis is reasonable. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the two 
distributions.
In a first step, it can be checked whether a higher fraction of seekers exhibits a 
positive level of reasoning. Interestingly, the number of level-0 players is 15 for both 
types and the fraction of positive level players is 0.69 (34 out of 49) for hiders and 0.67 
(31 out of 46) for seekers. In that respect, the proportion of strategic vs. non-strategic 
players is the same across tasks.
The difference in the average level seems to results from another phenomenon that I 
touched upon when discussing the lower and the upper bounds from the classification. 
Here again, it can be seen that there are more level-1 hiders than level-1 seekers. Also, 
there are clearly more level-2 seekers than level-2 hiders. Note that the more frequent 
level-1 hiders share with the more frequent level-2 seekers that they start the level 
reasoning by thinking about the intuitive response of a seeker to the framing. Table 
2.10 shows that there are indeed more players that start with a belief on a seeker than 
on a hider.
It is this phenomenon that seems to be behind the higher level of reasoning which 
is observed on average for seekers. Seekers that think about a seeker’s intuitive action 
are of levels 2, 4, 6, etc., while hiders are only of levels 1, 3, 5 etc. At the same time, 
it is not quite clear, why the seeker is an easier starting point for the reasoning. The 
results suggest that there is something intuitive about starting to think about the last 
decision maker whose decision does not need to anticipate anybody else’s decision.48
Level-0 belief The starting point of the reasoning is described by the estimates 
r*a, which -  in addition to the frame -  allow a statement on the attraction/aversion 
and also on the object of the belief, hider or seeker. Table 2.11 shows the results of 
the estimation.
The table shows that a level-0 belief on a hider is connected with B  aversion, while 
it is predominantly connected with B  attraction when about seekers. Although it can 
only be indicative, it is interesting to note that this is consistent with the level-0 action 
exhibited in figures 2.5 and 2.6, where hiders are indeed avoiding the B  and seekers 
mostly play the B. For the frame that distinguishes middle- and endpoints, it can be 
seen that the level-0 belief on both types considers an attraction to the midpoints.49
48Note that in the extensive form this game would be such that the seeker is considered first when 
applying backward induction under subgame perfection. The result indicates that there is something 
intuitive about this way of thinking in sequential settings.
49This is in accordance with findings in the psychological literature, which are about a natural 
attraction to middle objects in various settings (Christenfeld, 1995; Attali and Bar-Hillel, 2003).
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Table 2.11: Estimates r* tt.
t
Hider Seeker
r t
B2,at 0.00 0.75
r t
M,at 1.00 0.83
r t
A3,at 1.00 0.00
r t
A\,at 0.00 0.00
TM ,at 1.00 0.00
Table 2.12: Who is believed to react how?
Level-0 belief
Level-0 belief frame on hiders on seekers Total
52 , att 0 21 21
B2,av 20 7 27
M, att 2 10 12
M, av 0 2 2
A3, att 4 0 4
A3,av 0 1 1
A \,a tt 0 0 0
Ai,av 1 2 3
A4, att 2 0 2
A4, av 0 1 1
Total 29 44 73
The next table 2.12 shows how many observations lie behind these estimates. It 
can be seen that the last 3 frames are quite rare, so that these estimates should not 
be given significant weight. It is interesting to note, however, that the ^ 3-framed 
belief goes in the exact opposite direction of the 5-framed belief. The As attraction 
of hiders and the aversion of seekers fits in the picture of the 5-framed belief if it was 
the counterpart as conjectured earlier.
After distinguishing the level-0 belief depending on which types were thought 
about, one can also ask whether the beliefs differ depending on who holds these beliefs. 
Table 2.13 shows that the beliefs held do not differ much across tasks. For the two 
sufficiently often observed frames 5  and M, it can be seen that the previously observed 
patterns hold for both types individually. This indicates that the level-0 belief differs 
depending on whether it is about a hider or a seeker. However, it does not matter 
which type holds this belief.
Note that the hiders start more often to think about seekers while seekers start 
thinking about both types equally often. This pattern might, however, emerge from 
a superimposition of two effects. One is the expected higher proportion of level- 
1 reasoners than level-2 reasoners in a standard student population. This favours 
seekers as the object of hiders’ level-0 belief and hiders as the object of seekers’ level-0 
belief. The other effect is then the conjectured ease to start thinking about seekers.
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Table 2.13: Who holds these beliefs?
69
Hiders Seekers
LO belief LO belief
LO belief frame on seekers on hiders on seekers on hiders
B 2, att 12 0 9 0
B 2,av 4 11 3 9
M, att 5 0 5 2
M, av 2 0 0 0
A 3 , att 0 0 0 4
A 3,av 1 0 0 0
A i, att 0 0 0 0
A i,av 2 0 0 1
A 4 , att 0 1 0 1
A 4 , av 1 0 0 0
Total 27 12 17 17
This effect could apply to both types of players to the same extent and lead to the 
pattern at hand.
Choices by level and  ta sk  I said earlier that the ‘hide and seek’ game is charac­
terised by a non-existing link between the action choices and the level of reasoning of 
the players. The estimation results allow me to plot the choices by the different levels 
and types of the players in figure 2.9.
There is no clear-cut pattern in either of the two figures. For hiders, there is 
a tendency that players choosing B  are most likely level-2 players, while the choice 
of any A  would indicate level-0 or level-1 play. For seekers, the picture is even less 
indicative, playing ^3 hinting to level-1 and B  to level-0 reasoning.
2.5.3 Levels by tre a tm e n t
Six of the 8 sessions of the ‘hide and seek’ game where conducted after the participants 
had played three rounds of a ‘beauty contest’ with the same team decision structure 
and different teams, see chapter 1. While the absolute level of reasoning is not the 
focus of this study of the ‘hide and seek’ game, the data on the two sessions with­
out preceding ‘beauty contest’ can be used to check for any training effect regarding 
strategic thinking.
It can be seen that the average level of reasoning is indeed higher for the ‘hide and 
seek’ games if a ‘beauty contest’ treatment had been played before. This result might 
raise the question whether the previous participation of subjects in other experiments 
should be taken more seriously than it currently is.
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Figure 2.9: Hiders’ and seekers’ choices by level. 
Table 2.14: Summary statistics
T reatm ent M ean Std. Dev. N
Hiders BC/HS 1.00 0.83 36
HS 0.64 0.63 14
Seekers BC/HS 1.14 1.06 37
HS 1.00 0.701 9
Overall BC/HS 1.07 0.95 73
HS 0.78 0.67 23
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2.5.4 W ith in  su b jec t level com parison betw een gam es
For the mentioned ‘beauty contest’ treatments that were played before the ‘hide and 
seek’ treatments, the levels were estimated for individual players in chapter 1. This al­
lows me to do a within-subject comparison of level estimates between the two games.50 
Table 2.15 presents the data of 70 subjects, for which level estimates were found in 
both games.51
It shows that 26 subjects (~ 37%) are estimated to have the same level of reasoning 
in both games. 17 have one level more in the ‘beauty contest’ and 14 have one more 
in the ‘hide and seek’. 13 players in total differ by more than two levels between the 
games. The correlation between the two levels is slightly negative with —0.028.
In the light of discussions in the literature, these results are quite surprising. Often, 
a notion of a type of player emerges, which seems to imply that the level of reasoning 
should be typical for an individual. The results show that the levels of reasoning are 
highly variable across games and do not even show a positive correlation. At the same 
time, the shape and the mean of the level distribution of the population seems to be 
very stable across games. This suggests that the competence to reason strategically 
is distributed very similarly in the population for a given game, but does change a lot 
within a subject across games.
Table 2.15: Inter-game level estimate comparison.
Level ‘beauty contest’
0 1 2 3 Total
0 9 10 3 0 22
Level 1 7 14 6 0 27
‘hide and seek’ 2 6 7 3 1 17
3 2 1 0 0 3
4 1 0 0 0 1
Total 25 32 12 1 70
2.6 Conclusion
Using a novel experiment design, this chapter has investigated individual reasoning in 
a ‘hide and seek’ game. The qualitatively rich data obtained from team communication 
transcripts indicates that it is indeed adequate to capture non-equilibrium strategic 
thinking with a level of reasoning model.
The ‘hide and seek’ game allowed me to look into the influence of focality on the 
level-0 beliefs. I found that the level-0 belief is mostly shaped by the conspicuous B  
in the ABAA-iiaming. Hiders are believed to avoid this B  while seekers are believed 
to be attracted by it.
50A very similar picture emerges when comparing the lower and upper bounds within subjects and 
between games. Also, a distinction by task in the ‘hide and seek’ game does not change the results.
51The 4 players that exhibited equilibrium reasoning in either of the games (2 distinct players in 
the two games) were dropped from the sample.
2 THE ‘HIDE AND SEEK’ GAME 72
The two roles that players can take in the game allow to investigate influences of 
type heterogeneity on the reasoning. While the reasoning seems to be on higher levels 
on average for seekers, this is not a simple shift of the distribution, but induced by 
the predominant start of strategic thinking on the seeker’s action. This is to some 
extent reminiscent of backward induction, suggesting that it is somehow easier to 
think intuitively about a player whose decision is not anticipating anybody else’s.
The data allows to undertake a within-subject comparison of levels of reasoning, 
which leads to the result that the individuals’ levels of reasoning are not positively 
correlated between games. According to this result, the notion of a ‘type’ of player 
in terms of level of reasoning should not be evoked across games. Interestingly, the 
aggregate distribution of levels seems very stable, both between these games and 
compared to results in the literature. But individually there is apparently a lot of 
mobility in levels between games.
In addition to the original study in the first chapter, this chapter underpins that 
the experiment design with intra-team communication is a powerful tool in the inves­
tigation of individual reasoning. It provides a versatile structure that can be applied 
very generally and allows to monitor the understanding and the underlying reasoning 
in one-shot games.
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B A p p en d ix  
B .l Final decisions
For the final decision, the pattern for the seekers is virtually unchanged, so that no 
major influence from the team communication is apparent. For the hider, the most 
chosen location is now A\ instead of At, although this does not induce any conjecture 
as to what is at the root of this change.
Final decision Period 1 Hider Final decision Period 1 Seeker
Final Decision
Figure 2.10: Hiders’ final decisions 
(N=60).
Final Decision
Figure 2.11: Seekers’ final decisions 
(N=54).
B.2 O ther ABAA  treasu re  games
Action RTH4 Hider
Figure 2.12: 53 Hiders in 
Rubinstein et al. (1996).
Action RT Treas AABA Hider
Action RTH4 Seeker
Figure 2.13: 62 Seekers in 
Rubinstein et al. (1996).
Action RT Treas AABA^eker
.2118
Figure 2.14: 189 Hiders in 
Rubinstein and Tversky (1993).
Figure 2.15: 85 Seekers in 
Rubinstein and Tversky (1993).
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Action R_ABAA Hid^ r Action R_ABAA Seeker
AcHon
Figure 2.16: 50 Hiders in 
Rubinstein (1999).
F igure 2.17: 64 Seekers in 
Rubinstein (1999).
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B.3 E stim ation w ithout upper bounds
The estimation results that refrains from the use of the upper bounds from the com­
munication are very similar to the results presented earlier in this chapter. The main 
difference is that the levels are estimated to be higher for both types of players, 
r h  =  1.18 for hiders and t s  = 1.20 for seekers. One seeker is now even estimated 
to be level-5. The differences between hiders and seekers in the level estimate are 
much smaller, but the level-1 and level-2 patterns in the level histograms that were 
highlighted in the text are still present.
The level-0 belief estimates are also qualitatively similar to the ones in the estima­
tion with imposed upper bounds. The asymmetry between types terms of 5-attraction 
and 5-aversion is even more pronounced, like the common attraction to the middle- 
points. The estimates on the other beliefs are entirely unchanged.
Estimated level distribution Estimated level distribution
Figure 2.18: Hiders’ estimated level 
distribution with r h = 1.18.
Figure 2.19: Seekers’ estimated level 
distribution with t s  = 1.20.
Table 2.16: Estimates r*a (no upper bounds).
t
Hider Seeker
r t
B 2 ,at 0.00 1.00
r l
7 M ,at 1.00 1.00
r t 
A3 ,at 1.00 0.00
r t
A \,a t 0.00 0.00
r 1r A4,at 1.00 0.00
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B.4 Experiment instructions 
Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction
You axe about to participate in an experiment in team decision making. The experi­
ment is funded by the Michio Morishima fund, the London School of Economics and 
the German Society of Experimental Economic Research. Please follow the instruc­
tions carefully.
In addition to the participation fee of £5, you may earn an additional amount 
of money. Your decisions and the decisions of the other participants determine the 
additional amount. You will be instructed in detail how your earnings depend on your 
and the others’ decisions. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you 
in private, in cash, after today’s session.
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s 
screens. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your 
hand, and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you 
will be asked to leave. Thank you.
Since this is a team experiment, you will at various times be matched randomly 
with another participant in this room, to form a team that plays as one entity. Your 
team’s earnings will be shared equally between you and your team partner.
The experiment consists of four rounds and the way you interact as a team to take 
decisions will be the same throughout the experiment.
Now, let us explain how your T eam ’s A c tio n  is determined. In fact, both your 
team partner and you will enter a Final D ecision  individually and the computer 
will choose randomly which one of your two final decisions counts as your team’s 
action. The probability that your team partner’s final decision is chosen is equal to 
the probability that your final decision will be chosen (i.e. your chances are 50:50). 
However, you have the possibility to influence your partner’s final decision in the 
following way: Before you enter your final decision, you can propose to your partner a 
Suggested D ecision  and send him one and only one text M essage. Note that this 
message is your only chance to convince your partner of the reasoning behind your 
suggested decision. Therefore, use the message to explain your suggested decision to 
your team partner. After you finish entering your suggested decision and your message, 
these will be shown to your team partner. She/he will then make her/his final decision. 
Similarly, you will receive your partner’s suggested decision and message. You will 
then make your final decision. As outlined above, once you both enter your final 
decision, the computer chooses randomly one of your final decisions as your team’s 
action.
If you have any questions at this point, please raise your hand. In order for you
2 THE HIDE AND SEEK ’ GAME 77
to get familiar with the messaging system, you will now try it out in a Test Period . 
Please turn the page for further instructions.
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Test period
A participant in this room is now randomly chosen to be your team partner. The 
Test P eriod  has two rounds, with one question to answer in each round. Since this 
is only a test, your earnings will not depend on any decision taken now. In both test 
rounds you will need to answer a question about the year of an historic event. The 
team that is closest to the correct year wins.
As described, you will be able to send one Suggested D ecision  with your pro­
posed year and an explaining M essage. After having read your partner’s suggested 
decision and message, you will enter your Final D ecision. As described earlier, ei­
ther your or your partner’s final decision will be chosen randomly to be your T eam ’s 
A ction .
The messenger allows M essages  of any size. However, you have to enter the 
message line by line since the input space is only one line. Within this line you can 
delete by using the usual “Backspace” button of your keyboard. By pressing “Enter” 
on the keyboard, you add the written sentence to the message. Please note that only 
added sentences will be sent and seen by your partner. The words in the blue input 
line will n o t be sent. You can always delete previously added sentences by clicking the 
“Clear Input” button. The number of lines you send is not limited. You can therefore 
send messages of any length. You finally send the message to your partner by clicking 
the “Send Message” button.
When you are ready, please click the “Ready” button to start the Test Period.
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Start
You are about to start the experiment. You are now randomly matched with a new 
partner. For each of the next four rounds you will be matched with a new team 
partner, i.e. in each of the following rounds you will play with a different person.
In each of the four rounds your team will play against only one other team, a 
different team each round. From the four rounds, one round is chosen randomly 
and will be considered for determining the payoff. If your team wins this selected 
round, your team will earn £10 (£5 per team player). There will be no feedback 
after the individual rounds, you will be informed about your success at the end of the 
experiment.
Your task is the following:
In the beginning, the computer will tell you whether your role throughout the four 
rounds is “H ider” or "Seeker”.
If you are H ider, your task is to hide an object behind one of four items. In 
rounds 1 and 2, the object is a Treasure. In rounds 3 and 4, the object is a M ine. 
The hider team wins the round if the treasure was not found by the seeker or if the 
mine was found by the seeker. The seeker does not observe where you hide the object. 
The seeker will look behind one item in each round, not more and not less.
If you are Seeker, your task is to find the treasure in rounds 1 and 2 and to 
avoid the mine in rounds 3 and 4. The seeker team wins the round if it chooses the 
particular item behind which the treasure was hidden or if it chooses an item behind 
which the mine was no t hidden.
Remember, you can send a Suggested D ecision  and an explaining M essage to 
your team partner. (And note again that the words in the blue input line will no t be 
sent. Press “Enter” to add them to the message.) From your two Final D ecisions 
the computer again chooses the T eam ’s A ction .
When you click the “Ready” button, you will start the first round of the experi­
ment.
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B.5 Classification instructions 
Classification document 
Hide and Seek game - Period 1
In the following I will describe the classification process for the analysis of the ex­
periment. It is assumed that you are familiar with the level-A: model as it has been 
introduced by Nagel (1995) or represented by Camerer et al. (2004). The model here 
is extended to incorporate salience in the level-0 belief according to Bacharach and 
Stahl (2000). In order to clarify potential questions of terminology and introduce the 
main features of the model, the appendix reproduces the main features of the model 
in the terminology used in this document.
After your individual classification, you will meet with your co-classifier to reconcile 
your classification. In this process, try to agree on common classifications if possible 
and note them in the third sheet provided. If an agreement is not possible and both of 
you keep your initial individual classification, simply note nothing in the third sheet. 
If you have questions about the procedure at any point, please write an email to me 
and I will clarify any point in an email to both of you.
Please read this document and the instructions for the experiment entirely in order 
to get an overview and then start the classification based on the player’s sent message 
and action proposal. Note that the framing of the four possible locations is ‘ABAA’ in 
periods 1 and 3 and ‘1234’ in periods 2 and 4. A player can be of two types, hider or 
seeker. It is useful to go through the process first for all hiders and then for all seekers. 
This way, you keep the perspective of one type of player and do not get confused.
Please read the messages of each player, taking into account his action, and note for 
each player every possible level of reasoning. These should lie in an interval between 
the lower and upper bound of the level reasoning, as specified later in detail. Below 
you find detailed instructions for classifying each player. It is important that you limit 
yourself to making inferences only from what can clearly be derived from the message 
stated, i.e. do not try to think about what the player might have thought.
IM PO R T A N T: When you think that the inform ation  does not clearly 
lend itse lf to any inference, sim ply do not note any classification. Con­
sequently , do not note anything if  no sta tem en t has been made! Please  
note only those classifications fo r  which you are certain. Make use o f the 
com m ents space i f  you are not certain but s till want to indicate a feature  
o f the reasoning. S im ilarly, please comment i f  the sta tem en t exhibits som e  
argument that does not f it  the level-k model as I  present it  here.
Levels
For the lower bound on the level of reasoning, you should ask yourself: “What is 
the minimum level of reasoning that this statement clearly exhibits?” Once noted,
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you should be able to say to yourself: “It seems impossible that the players’ level 
of reasoning is below this number!” Here I ask you to be very cautious with the 
classification, not giving away high levels easily.
The upper bounds should give the maximum level of reasoning that could be 
interpreted into the statement. Therefore, you should ask yourself: “What is the 
highest level of reasoning that can be underlying this statement?” Once noted, you 
should be able to say: “Although maybe not clearly communicated, this statement 
could be an expression of this level. If the player reasoned higher than this number, 
this was not expressed in the statement!”
For both lower and upper bound, please refer to the following characterisation of 
the different levels.
Note that there are two necessary conditions for a player to exhibit a level greater 
than 0. First, the player has to be responsive to the salience of the games’ framing. 
Secondly, the player has to be strategic in best-responding to his level-0 belief, which 
is shaped by salience. If he did not react to salience, he would have no reason to chose 
one over the other object, resulting in random play. Interestingly, this random play 
is observationally equivalent to equilibrium behaviour. Therefore, the level-0 players 
can be those that react to salience and do not play strategically, or they can ignore the 
framing and hence play randomly. As far as possible, I want to distinguish uniform 
random level-0 play and equilibrium play. However, regarding the level classification, 
you can classify every random play as level-0 play. The equilibrium play is taken into 
account by a specific dummy.
Level 0 The player does not exhibit any strategic reasoning whatsoever. Different 
versions of this might be randomly chosen or purely guessed actions, misun­
derstanding of the game structure or other non-strategic ’reasons’ for picking 
a location, e.g. by taste or salience. It is important that no best-responding 
to the other’s play occurs. There could be considerations of what others might 
play, but without best responding to it. Examples52: “Well, it’s a pure guess” , 
“There are no arguments. Simply choose any.”
Level 1 This player best responds to some belief (in the treasure game, a hider 
mismatches the belief of the other’s action, a seeker matches his belief of the 
other’s action). However, he does not realise that others will be strategic as well. 
Example: “They are probably picking B, so we do as well”, “Its at the end and 
people would naturally go for the middle, no?”
Level 2 This player not only shows the basic strategic consideration of playing best 
response (matching/mismatching), but also realises that other players best re­
spond as well according to the belief they entertain. A level-2 player clearly 
contemplates how the other player might best respond to his frame. The player
52All examples have been made up for illustrative purposes.
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plays a best response to this hypothesised consideration. Example: “They may 
think most will look in the middle two, therefore choosing one in the end. I 
therefore choose the first one.”
Level 3 This player realises that others could be level-2 and reacts by best responding 
to the associated expected play. Put differently, he realises that others realise 
that others best respond to their initial belief. Therefore, a level-3 player clearly 
states that his opponent expects that he (the level-3 player at question) best- 
responds to a certain belief.
Level 4, 5, ... The process goes on in a similar fashion. The reasoning enters a cycle, 
in the sense that level-5 will come to the same best response as level-1. Please 
indicate in the comment section if the player reaches this cycling phase and 
recognises this pattern.
Level-0 belief
If level reasoning is observed in the statement, there has to be a starting point in the 
argument which states an attraction or aversion to one or more of the locations. This 
is then not derived by strategic reasons, but is an intuitive reaction to the framing of 
the locations. Otherwise, level reasoning would not occur.
Please indicate the underlying level-0 belief that is connected with each possible 
level of reasoning. Note that the level-0 belief of a person reasoning on an odd level, 
i.e. level 1, 3, 5, etc. is always with respect to how a player of the opposite side 
intuitively reacts to the framing. The belief of a person reasoning on an even level, 
i.e. level 2, 4, 6, etc. is always with respect to what the opposite type believes about 
the own type’s intuitive reaction. You will have this in mind and can note it for 
completeness in the “H/S”-box, but since it follows from your level indication, it is 
not essential.
Usually, the most information one can get out of the communication is the most and 
least attractive location respectively. For example, as a seeker, I might communicate 
that the hider is most attracted to the B  and then play central A. This indicates that 
the hider was believed to choose central A  with the (weakly) lowest probability and 
B  with highest probability. It follows that it will usually not be possible to rank all 
the locations by their attractiveness.
To reflect the exhibited level-0 beliefs please denote every level-0 belief by ranking 
the four locations with a ‘more attractive than’ relation. The locations are coded 
according to their position as ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’. In the example of the previous 
paragraph, the resulting statement is 2 > 14 > 3, since B  in the 2nd position is 
the most attractive location for the hider and central A, the ‘3’, the least attractive. 
Not putting anything between numbers indicates that their level of attractiveness 
cannot be distinguished, as in this case with the two A ’s at the beginning (position
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’1’) and at the end (position ’4’). Of course, depending on whether you get more 
or less information out of the communication, your statement can be 14 > 23 or 
2 > 4 > 3 > 1. This notation should be flexible enough to encode every piece of 
information on the level-0 belief that is present in the communication.
Imagine a seeker that you classify to be level-1 or level-2. If you determined his 
level-0 belief to be 2 > 134 (H) in the case he is level-1, then the level-0 belief should 
follow to be 134 > 2 (S) in the case he is level-2.53 For all cases where nothing in the 
communication speaks against this, feel free only to note the level-0 belief for the first 
conjectured level. A statement on each possible level’s level-0 belief is only necessary 
if you think it does not follow in this mechanical way.
In order to keep the overview over the best responses that are connected with 
certain types at certain levels, I will make a small Excel-sheet available, which calcu­
lates automatically the best responses as a function of a specified level-0 belief. This 
will help you to get a feeling for the mapping of communication and action into the 
parameters.
D um m y
E quilibrium  play In the description of the levels, I said that the level-0 player that 
does not react to the salience is considered to play randomly due to a lack of arguments 
for a specific option. Similarly, a player that plays according to the Nash equilibrium 
will have no argument for or against a specific option, therefore exhibiting the exact 
same behaviour. In order to distinguish the two where possible, please indicate here 
whether the player gives convincing arguments for his random play by mentioning 
that any location is a best response to random play. It is important that the fully 
random play of the others is considered and used in the best response argument. Put 
‘1’ if the player does so. Otherwise, the player will fit the description of level-0 players 
and the dummy should take the value ‘O’. Do not tick anything if the player is clearly 
neither one nor the other type or if the statement does not allow for a classification 
along these lines.
C oncluding rem arks
You might have noticed that there will be no classification of the population belief. 
This is because the opponents as a team are a single entity and a non-degenerate 
population belief makes only sense in a probabilistic interpretation. Also, the action 
will always54 maximally reflect the mode of the probabilistic population belief, mak­
ing it observationally equivalent to a degenerate population belief. This is why the 
population belief has not been discussed in the context of this game in the literature.
53This follows because for this last level-0 belief for a seeker, the previous level-0 belief of the hider 
constitutes a best response. Given the action of the player at hand, this is the way the levels and 
level-0 beliefs co-move.
54I abstract from considerations due to the cycling of behaviour from level 5 onwards.
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At the current point of the study I let these details remain in the background. Still, 
please indicate in a comment if a player exhibits any non-degenerate population belief.
Compared to the Beauty Contest, it might at times be difficult to distinguish what 
is a level-0 belief and what is derived through level reasoning. Try to stick to what is 
written down and look for clearly stated arguments of reasoning.
A ppendix: M odel and  term inology
The level-A: model of bounded rationality assumes that players only think through a 
certain number (k) of best responses.55 The model has four main ingredients:
P op u la tio n  d is trib u tio n  This distribution reflects the proportion of types with a 
certain level k 6 INo =  {0, 1, 2,3 ,4 ,5 ,...} .
Level-0 d is trib u tio n  By definition, a level-0 player does not best respond. Hence, 
his actions are random to the game and distributed randomly over the action 
space. In our case, the action space is A  — {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}} and contains 
the four possible locations to hide or seek the object. The model incorporates 
salience by assuming higher probabilities in the level-0 distribution for actions 
that are salient. In our case, the level-0 distribution would not assign a uniform 
probability of 0.25 to each possible action, but p > 0.25 to the salient one and 
Qi<p  for the remaining actions.
Level-0 belief In the model, the best responses of players with k > 0 are anchored 
in what they believe the level-0 players play. Their level-0 belief might not be 
consistent with the level-0 distribution. For best responding, all that matters 
is the expected payoff from choosing a particular location. One would there­
fore seek (hide) the treasure where the probability is highest (lowest), that the 
opponent chooses the same location.
P op u la tio n  belief Players do not expect other players to be of the same or a higher 
level of reasoning. For a level-fc player, the population belief is therefore defined 
on the set of levels strictly below k. It follows that level-0 players have no 
defined belief, level-1 players have a trivial belief with full probability mass on 
{0}, level-2 players have a well defined belief on {{0}, {1}}. From level 3 higher 
order beliefs are relevant as level-3 players have to form a belief about level-2’s 
beliefs.
55See the paper by Camerer et al. (2004) for a more detailed account of one version of the model.
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3 A m odel of heterogeneous ca­
reer concerns
3.1 Introduction
Career concerns have been studied by economists since Holmstrom (1999, first pub­
lished 1982) formalised the idea of Fama (1980) according to which concerns about 
reputation in the labour market suffice to mitigate moral hazard problems. Holm­
strom shows that costly effort is exerted because it increases the agent’s expectation 
of future wages by increasing the market’s belief of the worker’s productivity.
In recent years, economists have made extensive use of this idea and studied not 
only reputation for productivity56 but also for expertise57 and ideology58. The original 
model of Holmstrom considers one-dimensional productivity (“talent”), output and 
effort. In a generalisation, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a; 1999b) extend 
this model to multi-dimensional output and effort vectors and to a general stochastic 
relationship between output, effort and talent.
Apart from an appropriate use of past information and a sufficient weight of the 
wage revision process, one major prerequisite for effort to arise is the presence of 
uncertainty about the agent’s talent. In Holmstrom’s model the effort is monotonically 
increasing in uncertainty. One of Holmstrom’s extensions considers stochastic talent 
in order to avoid the situation of full revelation, allowing for stable effort exertion.
In this chapter I explore implications of heterogeneity among the agents in addition 
to varying talent. The agents differ in the magnitude of career concerns, which leads 
them to exert different levels of effort in a given situation. If principals are uncertain 
about this aspect of the agent’s type, I find that depending on the circumstances, this 
additional uncertainty might decrease total effort exertion over time.
Looking at the real world it seems to be very realistic to think about heterogeneous 
levels of career concerns. People have different aspirations, different cost of effort, value 
more or less their income in the future or might exhibit optimism. Furthermore, it 
does seem that the level of effort varies considerably across individuals.
The most closely related paper to this study is by Koszegi and Li (2008). In their 
analysis the heterogeneity arises due to varying ‘drive’ or ‘ambition’ of the agent. They 
introduce heterogeneity by assuming a differing marginal utility of income. While they 
use a three-period model to depict the implications of the heterogeneity, much of the 
general intuition about heterogeneity can be found in their analysis. The analysis with 
infinite periods in section 3.3 is based on their theoretical setup. To my knowledge it 
is the only work that considers the implications of additional heterogeneity.
56See, for example: Tirole (1994).
57See, for example: Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prendergast and Stole (1996), Ottaviani and 
Sorensen (2006), Levy (2007), Prat (2005).
58See, for example: Coate and Morris (1995), Morris (2001), Maskin and Tirole (2004).
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Generally, heterogeneous career concerns can be introduced in other ways. First, 
the level of concern for the future is reflected in the time discount rate 6 . People that 
value their present situation more have a higher 5 and hence exert less effort for the 
purpose of reputation building.
The second, relatively obvious possibility is a differing cost of effort. This point is 
not specific to the career concerns model and would lead to varying effort levels under 
explicit incentives as well. Still, this interpretation is fully in line with the analysis of 
different levels of career concerns.
Third, the set of relevant future employers can be different so that varying firm pro­
ductivities lead to different income prospects. For example, agents that are willing to 
go abroad have potentially higher career concerns due to higher payment expectations. 
Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999b, p. 216) consider this to be an interesting way 
to think about incentives in government agencies. The study by Wilson (1989) sug­
gests the relevance of incentives from sources external to the agency. In previous work 
I considered the implications of facing multiple principals in career concerns under 
certainty (Penczynski, 2006).
I show in this study that there are setups in which the introduction of uncertain 
type traits strictly decreases the effort exertion of all types of agents. This follows from 
an effect which was coined ‘backward attribution’ by Koszegi and Li (2008). Here, 
the muting of effort follows from the attribution of past output to effort rather than 
talent in the case of high present effort (and output), implying an ex post downward 
correction of the inferred talent. It can be shown that this effect is responsible for a 
general effort reduction in any two-period career concerns model.
In the analysis of setups of more than two periods, an additional ‘forward attri­
bution’ enters the stage since it becomes desirable to signal high career concerns. A 
high effort level in the beginning ‘promises’ high effort in remaining periods due to 
high expected career concerns, potentially increasing the future wage due to a higher 
expected effort level. Of course, in a setup with more than two periods, both forward 
and backward attribution are present, making the analysis of effort exertion in any 
period depend on the past, present and future effort allocations, information updates 
and incentives.
In order to present the main results of such a consideration, the chapter is struc­
tured as follows. Section 3.2 uses the framework of Dewatripont et al. (1999a; 1999b) 
in order to consider the two-period setup in full generality. Section 3.3 uses the setup 
of Koszegi and Li (2008) to analyse the multi-period situation. Extensions and limi­
tations are discussed in the concluding section 3.4.
3.2 T he general tw o-period  m odel
Although I mentioned equivalent ways of thinking about the heterogeneity in a career 
concerns model, I will stick to the interpretation of facing multiple principals or labour
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markets in upcoming periods. This view assumes that agents differ with respect to 
their set of principals or the subjective probability they attach to elements in this 
set. While I refrain from modelling the underlying considerations that give rise to this 
heterogeneity, I suppose it is very realistic to assume that each agent has its own view 
about his future, a view that might be influenced by his ambition, private priorities, 
optimism and so forth. Due to the multitude of factors it should be the rule rather 
than exception that agents differ in the magnitude of their career concerns.
Making use of this interpretation, it can be said that so far results in career con­
cerns models have been obtained under common knowledge of the agent’s probability 
distribution u>i over the set of principals V. Under these circumstances the equilibrium 
effort is easily calculable since there is no unknown force that influences the marginal 
incentives of the agents. In a model without observation error on output, the talent 
would be fully revealed after the first period.
In the following I will look at a situation in which principals do not perfectly know 
the provenance of the agents implicit incentives.
Consider two labor markets that pay differently for the same individual talent 0. 
One might think of differences in real terms of payments or in productivity levels (e. g. 
Kremer, 1993), which imply a mapping from underlying talent to productivity that is 
heterogeneous across markets. The agents hold a certain belief of ending up in either 
one of the markets. Furthermore, I assume that there is a “domestic” market that 
pays the marginal product kd • E(0\y) and a “foreign” market which pays k f  • E(0\y) 
with k f > kd after observing the output y.
Initially, I consider two types of agents that are differing in the probability that 
they assign to ending up in either of the two markets. These probabilities and the 
productivity differences result in expected future wages of k° • E(y 2 \yi) for the lower 
type, i. e. the agent that attaches a higher probability to the low productivity market. 
The high type expects a future wage of k 1 • E(y2 \yi).
While both the markets and the agent have no information about the talent apart 
from the joint density f ( 0 , ?/|a), the agent knows his probability distribution u>i over the 
set of principals, but the market has only a prior belief about the type59, Pr(type 1) =  
q and Pr(type 0) =  1 — q.
The further setup in this section is similar to Dewatripont et al. (1999a; 1999b). 
The agent exerts effort at in period t  and the inference is based on f(0 , y\a), the known 
joint density function of talent 0 and output y conditional on the effort a. The cost 
of effort is denoted c(a).
59To be precise, it has to be said that under this interpretation the principal not only infers the 
talent from the observed output, but also from the fact that the agent is now present in his market. 
Therefore, we need to have a situation in mind in which no agent excludes any market. This would 
provide further information to the principal of the excluded market about the population of agents 
he faces. Strictly, I need to interpret the population distribution which is reflected by the probability 
q of facing a high type to be specific to the principal.
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T he m odel u n der certa in ty  abou t th e  ty p e  The heterogeneity of the agents is 
reflected by the factor kl . They choose the effort a in order to maximise the expected 
payoff
max k f • Ey[E(0\y,a*)\ — c(a), 
for which the first order conditions are
k* [ f e m y \ a * ) f § j ^  dy &  =
JJ f(y\a*)
where f(y\a) = f  f ( 0 ,y\a) dO.
Consequently, the marginal incentives as derived in Dewatripont et al. (1999a, p. 186) 
will change to the following expressions
• C m  ( e, k -
V  /
These first order conditions determine the level of effort exerted in the case where 
the magnitude of career concerns, reflected by is common knowledge.
j  =  c0(a*).
T he m odel u n d er un certa in ty  ab o u t th e  ty p e  Even without common knowl­
edge of the magnitude of career concerns, in equilibrium the principals’ belief about 
the equilibrium effort of the two types of agents will be correct. However, as the type 
is not fully revealed by observation of the output, the principals can only remunerate 
on the basis of an inference that uses an expected effort level
a* = P r (type k*\y) • a1* +  P r (type k°\y) • a0*.
The principals use the information about the output to update their prior belief about 
the type that they face according to Bayes’ rule
o u  / i n  Pr(y\type k) • Pr(type k)Pr{type k\y) = -------------^ ------------- .
With the new level of uncertainty the objective function of the agent of type k becomes
max k  • Ey [Ek [E(9\y,a*)]\ -  c(a), (3.1)
which becomes
f(y\a) d y -c (a ) .  (3.2)
The new element in this expression is the sum which reflects the expectation with 
respect to the equilibrium effort level of the types.
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For the subsequent results and for simplicity, we need to formulate two assump­
tions. Firstly, it is assumed that the expression in brackets
Jfc1
k=ko \ J o  f ( v W k*) )
is equal to
e f { 0 ,y\a*) dQ ^  ^
h f(y\a*)J ,
with a* = Y:k=k° Pr{k\y)ak*. That is, it is assumed to be irrelevant whether the 
principals pays according to the marginal product computed with the expected effort 
level, or whether they pay according to the expected marginal product on the basis of 
each type’s equilibrium effort level. Of course, this assumption is only correct if the 
relationship between effort level and inferred marginal product is linear, which is not 
necessarily the case. However, this light assumption makes computations tractable in 
the following.
Secondly, both the posterior density functions and f(y\a) have the strict
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) with respect to effort a. This implies 
that the posterior distribution conditional on effort a0  first-order stochastically domi­
nates the distribution conditional on a 1 if a1 > a0 (See Milgrom, 1981, Proposition 2). 
For the model at hand this implies that the inferred talent decreases with the exerted 
effort as
/ / ( * ) ■ f t  y V d e >  f mJ e  /(w ou) J e
dQ.
h f { y |a°)  f ( y  la1)
These assumptions are not strong either, since it is plausible that an increased effort 
increases output, hence the strict MLRP on f(y\a). For a given level of output, say 
the observed level, an increase in effort will imply a reduced importance of talent, 
hence the lower inference with respect to talent.
P roposition  1 In the two-period Holmstrom model of career concerns the uncertainty 
about the magnitude of the agents’ career concerns reduces the equilibrium effort of all 
types of agents.
Proof. To see the change in the analysis to the case of common knowledge, compare 
the rewritten integral
/  k (Pr(type k°\y) • E(0\y, a0*) +  Pr{type k l \y) • E ( 6 \y, a1*)) f(y\a) dy (3.4) 
Jy
with the expression of the marginal incentives in the case of certainty:
f  kE (6 \y,a*)f(y\a) dy. 
dy
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The main difference between these two expressions is that the observed output impacts 
on the expected talent in the case of certainty, while it impacts both on the expected 
talent and on the probability of facing a certain agent of type k in the other case.
Note that E(6\y, a) decreases in a for a given y by the assumed strict MLRP. 
Therefore, in our case of two types and for an observed output y, we get
£ ( % ,« “*) > E ( %  a1*).
Furthermore, we can state that Ylk=k° TV(fc|y) = 1- Therefore,
d d— Pr(type 0|y) =  Pr(type l\y)
A small change in exerted effort leads to a higher expected output as the density 
function now gives relatively more weight to higher output levels by the MLRP. In 
order to make a statement about the implications for the whole integral as in equa­
tion 3.4 the following part of the integrand has to be analysed for the situation of y 
increasing marginally.
Pr{ type 0|y) • E(6\y, a0*) + Pr( type l\y) • E(6\y, a1*).
The derivative of this integrand with respect to y gives
A ( )  = ^Pr(O\y)E(9\y,aon  +  Pr(O\y)AB (0\y,ao') +  
A P r (l\y)E(9\y, au ) +  P r ( l \ y ) A E (0\y, a1*)
=  £ p r (0 \y )  [E (e \y ,a^)  -  E(e\y,au )]+ A E (e\y,a*) (3.5)
'  <0  /  >0
By our assumption in equation (3.3), the last term here reflects the happenings 
under certainty, a higher output for a given effort leading to an increased expectation 
of talent. Integrated over all possible y this will lead to the positive marginal benefit 
of exerting effort.
Due to the uncertainty with respect to the types, there is an additional negative 
term which results from the change in the probability of being associated with one 
of the two types multiplied by the impact on the expected talent. It follows that 
the overall integrand is less strongly increasing in the output level, implying that the 
integral as a whole is reduced.
Put differently, the marginal incentive that in the case of certainty we used to 
express in terms of Cov (o, will now be lower because the link between 6 and y 
has been weakened. The first-order conditions will determine an optimal level of effort 
that is lower for both types of agents involved. To see the proof for finitely many types
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of agents please refer to the appendix C.l. ■
3.2.1 Is it possible to  have a  com plete offset o f incentives?
The previous section could prove that the implicit incentives are muted under un­
certainty. It would be interesting to know, whether this uncertainty could make all 
incentives vanish?
In order to answer this question in a rather heuristical fashion, we need to look 
again at the expression in equation 3.5. In order to offset the complete impact of 
a change of output on the expected talent -^E ( 0 \y, a*), we can see that both the 
impact on the probability Pr(Q\y) and the difference in evaluation the expected 
talent depending on the effort have to be large. Note that the maximum value of 
■§jjPr(0\y) is 1.
For a certain value of output y , a complete offset is plausible. If the probability 
Pr(Q\y) changed by 0.9 and the according difference E(d\y,a0*) — E ( 6 \y,a1*) is high 
while the impact on the expected talent -^E ( 0 \y, a*) is low, the increase of output 
would (locally) do harm and lead to a loss in reputation.
However, as we are discussing the integrand of an integral, an offset implies that a 
loss occurs or no reputational benefits obtains when integrating over the whole range 
of output levels. The range is existing due to the uncertainty of the agent regarding 
his talent. So there is no specific level of output foreseeable.
While the whole range of E ( 6 \y,a*) has an absolute value of max# — min# as­
suming that the density function has a large enough support, the expression Pr(Q\y) 
changes only by 1 over the whole spectrum of y. Multiplied with the difference in 
expected talent due to heterogeneous efforts, one might roughly get a value of even 
this difference. From there it seems plausible that a certain level of incentives always 
remains and that complete offset is not possible. Our example in the following will 
illustrate this.
3.2.2 A sim ple exam ple
While the previous section treated the very general case, in the following I will provide 
a more tangible example in which I will be able to solve for the equilibrium effort level 
and show explicitly the muting of the incentives.
I will consider the production function y =  9 +  a where talent and effort are 
perfect substitutes. The agent’s talent is distributed uniformly on [0,1], a value which 
is unknown to both the principals and the agents ex ante.
The agent can be of two different types. The principal attaches a probability of 
q on the agent being of type k1 who is expecting k 1 * E ( 6 \y\) as future wage. With 
probability 1 — q the agent expects k° • E(9\y\) as future wage and is of type k°. 
Without loss of generality we can normalise k° to 1 and k 1 to 1 +  c.
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In order to keep the model tractable, I consider a two-period model and a disutility 
of effort of g(a) =  ^a2. The timing is like in the original model of Holmstrom (1999). 
In the notation, superscripts are referring to types, subscripts to time periods.
M odel un d er certa in ty  Let me briefly describe the situation without uncertainty. 
We know that in the second period the lack of career concerns leads to no effort 
exertion a,2 = 0. Therefore the agent solves
max W  =  -p (a i)  +  8  [fc1 • E(0\yi) \ , 
where E(9\yi) = E(yi) — a*. From the first order conditions it follows
g'(a\) =  a\* = 8  • k 1 = (1 +  c) 8
By similar reasoning the agent not facing the additional principal will end up with 
g'{ai) = a®* = 5 ■ k° = 5.
M odel w ith  uncerta in ty  Following the previous paragraph we can state that the 
expected effort level is a* = g-a}*+(l—gO-aJ*. However, this is not the full specification 
of the equilibrium effort because the principals observe 2/1 before making an inference 
about the agent’s talent and paying the second period wage. The observation of 2/1
allows for a better inference of the true talent and enables an updating of the prior
probabilities. In our case of the uniform distribution, for some 2/1 the talent can be 
inferred with certainty if only one type can produce this amount of output given the 
equilibrium effort levels of the two types. Therefore, for some 2/1 it is not optimal 
to pay the wage according to an inference based on the expected effort as formulated 
above. Depending on the region of y\ the principals then have three ways of calculating 
the inferred effort .
•  If 2/1 < 0 +  a\* = y , then Pr(type 0|2/i) =  1 and the principals would rationally 
be willing to pay up to y\ — a®* > y\ — q • a}* — (1 — q) • a{*. So for low enough y\ 
the agent of type 0 benefits from being identified as exerting less effort, which 
then increases his inferred talent.
• If 2/1 > 1 +  a?* =  y then Pr  (type l|2/i) =  1 and the principals would rationally 
be willing to pay only up to 2/1 — a}* < yi — q * a\* — (1 — q) * aj*. For high 2/1 the 
agent of type 1 is identified as a more ‘concerned’ type exerting higher effort, 
leading to a lower inferred talent.
• For 0 + a\* < 2/1 < 1 +  a?* the observation of the output does not convey 
any information about the agent’s type, therefore the principals would pay 
2/i — q • a\* — (1 — q) • a®* according to the expected effort level. Note that in 
this case the inferred talent is biased. Some of the effort of type 1 is interpreted 
as talent and some of the talent of type 0 is interpreted as effort.
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This endogenous partition itself has an impact on the equilibrium effort of the 
agent because it influences the probability of falling in one of the two categories.
f(y)
0 +  a'
type  0
type 1
0
Figure 3.1: The output distribution for the two types.
Proposition 2 In the two-period career concerns model with uniform talent distribu­
tion the equilibrium effort levels are given by
a j*  = <5(1 + c) 11 + (1 — <?)--------------     r ) ,
a f  =  6 (  1 + --------- ^  )  .
Both levels are strictly smaller than their respective counterpart under certainty. 
Proof. The agent’s maximisation problem becomes 
max I F 1 =  —g(a\)  +ai
(5(1 +  c) ( ( 2 / 1  -  a\*) • P r{yi >  y) +  (yi -  q ■ a }* -  (1 -  q) ■ a?*) • P r{y x <  y)) ,
where
P r(y i >  y) =  P r(9 + a i >  1+aJ*) =  P r(6  >  l + a j * - a i )  =  l - ( l + a { * - a i )  =  - a { * + a i .
Hence 8Pr^ ; >5> =  1 and 8 Prf a <e> = -1 .
The first order condition therefore turns out to be
-g '(a i)+ 6 { l+ c )  ( [Pr(yi  >  y) +  (yx -  a?*)] +  [—( 2 / 1  -  qa\* -  (1 -  q ) a f )  +  P r(y Y <  £ ) ] )  =
which can be solved for a j*  =  <5(1 + c) ( l  +  (1 — q){a\* — a }* ) ) .  The same reasoning 
for type 0 gives a®* =  <5(1 +  (/(a?* — a\*)). Solving for the equilibrium levels of effort 
proofs the claim.
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Furthermore, it can be shown that
a\* = <5(1 +  c) < (5(1-fc)
< (5.
To see more clearly what happens consider the case of (5 =  1, such that
Now the implications of proposition 1 can be shown easily. The incentives are muted 
for both types of agents and lead to lower effort levels.
This result suggests that in spite of the presence of an extra motivation of one 
type of agents, the incentives are muted due to the uncertainty. In particular, the 
type with higher career concerns will have muted incentives because at a certain level 
of output he will be revealed to be of this type, allowing for a perfect revelation of 
his talent. This is in contrast with a positively biased belief about his talent in the 
case where the principal/market can not infer which type of agent he faces. Increasing 
effort means for the motivated agent to decrease the probability of having this bias 
working for him.
For the less concerned agent this argument works in the other direction, but im­
pacts his equilibrium effort in the same direction. For low enough outputs he is known 
to be of his type, which allows for a perfect revelation of his true talent. A high effort, 
however, increases the likelihood of facing the negative bias in the inferred talent, 
therefore reducing the incentives to exert effort. Interestingly, the incentives are now 
lower than without the presence of motivated types, in other words efficiency is re­
duced due to the uncertainty. Vice versa, it can be said that the possible presence 
of certain types of agents and the principals limited information about this decreases 
the effort of others.
Note that in Holmstrom (1999) the uncertainty about the talent is a driving factor 
of effort exertion because this way there remains scope to influence the principals 
beliefs. Since the updating reduces incentives over time, Holmstrom introduces a 
model with time-varying talent so that the result of decreasing and vanishing effort 
exertion is altered. In contrast, here the uncertainty about the origin of incentives 
mutes the effort.
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3.2.3 An observation on the wage bias
While the analysis so far focussed on the exerted effort, it is worth directing attention 
for a moment towards the wage that is paid to the agents. In the framework of the 
simple example in the previous section, it can be seen that in the case of full revelation 
of the type through output {y\ < y or y\ > y) the wage is appropriate for every agent 
since the principal knows the exact talent of the agent.
However, in the case of unchanged uncertainty, the wage payment will be made 
according to the expected effort level, thereby biasing the wage for the agent with low 
career concerns downwards and vice versa (yi — q • aj* — (1 — q) • a®*). The existence 
of higher types in the dimension of the added heterogeneity therefore imposes an 
externality on the lower types.
This observation hints towards a general bias against agents with a higher cost 
of effort, a lower patience or a lower ‘drive’. In fact, considering optimism as the 
dimension of added heterogeneity, this observation might help explain why a stable 
share of society display irrationally optimistic beliefs about the future.
Assume that c reflects the bias in expectation of future economic outlooks of the 
optimists (type 1). The other agents do have rational expectations (type 0). This 
leads to the following wages w and welfare W  for the two types
w\* =  9 +  (1 — q)cS, 
u?2* =  0 — qcS,
W 1 = -i(<5(l +  e))2 +  ,5(0 +  ( l - g)c<5)
W° = -^<52 +  <5(0 -  qcS)
It can be shown that W 1 — W ° < 0, i. e. that the optimists’ bias does not lead to 
a preferable situation compared to the realists. However, since the two types should 
get the same wage, the difference in welfare should be the full cost of the additional 
effort A =  \ 8 2 c{ 2  +  c). Instead, due to the bias it is reduced to ^ 8 2 c(2 +  c) — c52 = 
A - c62 =  ±82c2.
It can be seen that this bias mitigates the consequences of the bias in the expec­
tations of future outcomes of the optimists. As they do not feel the full strength of 
the consequences it might not be obvious that keeping this bias is welfare reducing.
In an empirical analysis about the existence of optimism in society Puri and Robin­
son (2007) find out that many people are relatively optimistic with respect to their 
life-expectancy and future economic situation. Furthermore, their analysis shows that 
socioeconomic choices of optimists differ significantly across different areas like retire­
ment, investment and saving decisions, remarriage etc.
One particular finding is that optimists use to work more hours. Referring to a 
common interpretation of worked hours as spent effort, we can relate this finding to
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the result of the presented model. The fact that optimists assume a brighter future 
implies that for them their present actions echo louder in the future since there is 
more ‘at stake’. Hence, for them there is a good reason to put more effort than 
others, especially since they will not feel the full consequence of their incorrect beliefs.
3.3 Additional heterogeneity in the infinite periods model
When additional heterogeneity is considered in a multi-period setting, both the ‘back­
ward attribution’ and the ‘forward attribution’ play a role in determining the incen­
tives at a given point in time. In the three-period model of Koszegi and Li (2008) 
the first period is characterised by a forward attribution that is higher than the back­
ward attribution, leading to a higher effort level than under certainty. This raises the 
question about the general relationship between these two effects in a multi-period 
model.
The interplay between the two effects will be determined by the information avail­
able and hence by the updating process as sketched in figure 3.2. At the same time, 
the resulting effort influences the updating process, making the process depending on 
both past and future actions.
oo
talent and type signalling
:Q
0 no signalling, a = 0 oo
Figure 3.2: Talent and type updating over time.
3.3.1 The m odel setup
Consider an infinite period model at time t. In order to obtain a tractable reputation 
model, but still illustrate the main trade-off, I will consider an agent that is concerned 
about the next period’s wage only. This implies that only his immediate reputation 
is relevant to him. Furthermore, in order to obtain a tractable model of the updating
3 HETEROGENEOUS CAREER CONCERNS 97
process I will specify the talent distribution to be normal.
The setup follows mainly Koszegi and Li (2008). The output is given by yt — 9 +  at +  £f, 
where 9 ~  N(0, <j|) and £t ~  N(0, a2). The heterogeneity is introduced through the 
factor k ~  N (p k: ak), which reflects the magnitude of the career concerns like in the 
two-period model before.
I consider equilibria that are linear rational expectation equilibria with a* = a* • k. 
There is a quadratic cost on effort exertion c(at) =  \a 2. While both agents and 
principals are not informed about the talent, the type k realisation is known to the 
agent but not to the principal.
Due to perfect competition for the agent’s labor force, his wage in each period is 
equal to the expectations of the principal regarding his output E(yt+i\yt)- The priors 
concerning 6  and k are assumed to incorporate the full information available at time 
t. Abstracting from discounting, the agent’s maximisation problem looks as follows
max —c(at) +  kEytE(yt+i\yt).at
The corresponding first order conditions imply that a£ =  k dEn E^ t+1^yt\  Prom 
the linear rational expectation equilibrium it follows that at = dEy$yt+ 1 > sinCe due 
to the additivity of the output, the derivative with respect to at is the same as with 
respect to output y. In order to calculate this partial derivative, note that wt+1 =  
E(yt+i\yt) = E(0 + at+i\yt) = E(E(0\k,yt)\yt) + E(at+i\yt), where E{at+i\yt) = 
at+iE(k\yt). Overall, the expression for the wage becomes:
wt+iE(yt+i\yt) = E{E{9\k,yt)\yt) +  a t+iE (k\yt).
Proposition  3 In the infinite-period normal career concern model with a one-period 
reputation horizon, the equilibrium effort factor at can be stated implicitly as a func­
tion of at+1 as follows.
dEytwt+1 _ cr2e  ^ dE(k\yt) . _ dE(k\yt)
 O   =  a t =  o  i 2  "2 , 2  a t  O   +  a t + 1  5 -----------  ( 3 -6 )oyt o i +  cr| a i +  oyt oyt
backward attribution forward attribution
=  _ _ d ___________________ ________  atPkat+1 (o
o* +  o* (a2 +  a 2a 2 +  a j ) (a j  +  a?) +  a 2 +  a 2a 2 + 4  ' J
_ o-g + atat+ia 2k 
a 2 +  a 2 cj2 +  al
Proof. See appendix C.2. ■
3.3.2 Characteristics of the effort level in period t
Proposition 4 The effort level a t'k  is 0 only ifk  is 0. As long as we have uncertainty 
about the talent 9 at is never equal to 0.
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Proof. Using at — 0 in equation 3.8, we get
ad
° = - 2 T - 2 ’
a contradiction as long as we have uncertainty about the talent 6 . ■
Proposition 5 at can only be negative if dEQ y^  < 0, i. e. if  the type update increases 
with lower output, which is equivalent to a negative forward attribution.
Proof. Requiring the right hand side of equation 3.7 to be negative, we observe 
that the backward attribution is always negative, even with a negative at, but never 
outweighs the first part from the talent signalling. To reach a level below 0, the 
forward attribution has to be negative. Transforming the negativity condition, we get
ae i i
— 2  < \at\at+i,
a k
implying that a t+i needs to be positive for this condition to be satisfied, since the 
fraction on the left hand side is always positive. Hence, the only way to obtain a 
negative forward attribution is < 0. ■
Proposition 6 Given initial uncertainty, there does not exist an equilibrium with 
a t < 0.
Proof. Economically, it does not make sense to consider a situation in which — <
0. An agent that would want to signal his talent through a high output, would not 
destroy output to signal drive. Hence, assuring that dEj£}^  < 0 does not make eco­
nomical sense, the first order conditions cannot be met with any at < 0. Therefore, 
any equilibrium must exhibit at > 0. ■
3.3.3 Relating effort levels in period t and t + 1
In the career concerns model as I propose it here, there is still the important notion 
of uncertainty that drives the effort exertion of the agent. It can be seen that at =  0 
if and only if both <Jq = 0 and <r| =  0. Recalling that any equilibrium in which 
uncertainty exists exhibits a positive a, it is clear that the dynamic path of effort 
exertion is tightly connected with the information flow and updating of talent and 
type estimates.
Proposition 7 With every observation of realised output, the talent and type es­
timates become more precise. Therefore, as t —* oo, all uncertainty vanishes and 
at =  0.
Proof. In equations 3.10 and 3.12 (page 110) it can be seen that both < <j\ and 
Oq < cr|, where a  reflects the new variance after updating with one period’s output
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information. The updating can only result in an unchanged variance if the variances 
are 0 already. Hence, over time the uncertainty must vanish, implying that at = 0. ■
Lem m a 8 It will never be that at =  at+i when at+2 < oct-
Proof. Suppose yes and at =  <*t+i, then equation 3.8 implies
dg +  atat+2^1 _  <7g +  atat°k
00 +  a t ° l  +  +  aWk +  ae '
Referring to equations 3.10 and 3.12 again, it can be seen that
+  atat+2^1 e l  +  Qi.tat<y\
+ al  00 +  aWk +  al  ’
contradicting the initial assumption. ■
P ro p o sitio n  9 For all periods t it will be true that at > at+i- 
P roof. Suppose not and at < Ot+i, implying that
+ a t + i a t + r f l  gj + (*t<*t+i gj
+  a t + i ° l  + CT? + a b l  +  '
With proposition 7 this must be in particular true for a situation in which both
at < at+1 and at+2 < <*t+1, since at will go to zero at some point. Multiplying the
equation by the two denominators, the condition becomes
°dal ( a t ~  a t&t+1) +  (T0 dl(at+ ia t + 2  ~  a%+1) +  a la l(a?a t+ia t + 2  -  a to%+i) >
0e(00 ~ 00) +  at+10?(Q!t0fc -  «t+20fc)3
Using the relationship between a# and d j from equation 3.12, this is a contradiction 
since the left hand side is negative and the right hand side positive. ■
C on jectu re  10 There exists a linear equilibrium in which at > 0 Vt and at >
at+i Vt.
The argument evolves around the relevant equation 3.8
_ 0?,0 +  atat+10?,*
0 ^  2  1 2  9  1 O ’
^ le  + ^ l k  + ^ i
For a sufficiently large positive constant K , consider the set
S  = {(01, 02, a s , .. .)\K > a \ > a<i > as > . . .  >  0}
in R°°. The map /  : S  —► IR00 is defined componentwise, placing in t-th position the
right-hand side of equation 3.8.
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As opposed to earlier in this chapter, now the variances of talent and type have to 
be indexed by the period t. The law of motion for <jfe is given, analogous to equation 
3.12, to be
2 _
<r‘+M ° h + ° v
which is independent of the sequence of effort choices {at}. The law of motion for cr|fc 
is given in equation 3.10 to be
2 _  2 .  2 
° t ,k  cr2a + a 2(72 f c + ( r 2 ° t ,k
which is decreasing in a t . Both processes start with initial finite values erf k and 
cr\ e. Through the dependence of crf+l k on at, all previous effort choices are relevant, 
leading to an expression f t = / t( a i ,  a 2, . • •, at, at+i).
I conjecture that it is possible to check that the map /  is inward as defined in 
Halpern and Bergman (1968)60 by checking that, at the boundaries of 5, the map 
/  points into the subspace that includes S. This should be assured by the following 
conditions which can be proven to hold:
1. One can choose K  such that it is true that f \{ K , a 2) < K  for any a 2  < K .
2. For finite t , whenever at = at+1, it is true that ft{a i , . . . ,  a*+i) > f t+i ( a i , . . . ,  a*+2) 
for any given ( a i , . . . ,  at) G S*, where Sr denotes the space spanned by the r 
first dimensions of S.
3. For any finite t it is true that ft(a  1, . . . ,  a*+i) > 0.
4. /  is continuous.
Condition 1 can be proven to hold by looking at
which is always less than one for af > 0 and a 2 < K . Any K  > 1 will satisfy this 
condition.
60A map F : S —> X  is called inward if for all points s € S, F(s) belongs to the inward set. For a 
given s G S, the inward set is the “union of all rays originating at s and drawn so as to pass through 
some other point r  of S." (p. 353).
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For condition 2 to hold under at = «t+i, it can be shown that 
°t,e +  a t at,k at+i,e +  a ta t+2 at+i,k
+ a t aik  +  Gi a t+i,e +  <*t°t+i,k +
This can be seen by multiplying out and rewriting the inequality without the expres­
sions that cancel out as
2 2 2  , 2  2 , 2 2  2 2  , 2 2  2 ^°t,9 • a t <7t+i,fc + a t,e ' + <*t v t,k • OLt (7t+hk +  a t a tj  - <r£ >
°t,e ’ a ta t+2 &t+i,k +  at+i,o ' +  a t°t,k ' ata t+2 <^ t+i,k +  a ta t+2°‘t+i>jfe * Re­
combining the facts that a^e > a +^10, a^k > 0f+1?fc, and that a f >  atat+2 , this 
inequality will hold for any cr|+1 k and -  since this is the only point where earlier ar, 
r < t come in -  therefore also for any ( a i , . . . ,  at) 6 S'*. Note that this argument 
includes boundary locations in further dimensions.
For condition 3, note that f t (a 1, . . . ,  c*t+i) is positive for finite t and converges to 
0 only as t —> 00, due to the trajectory of
Condition 4 is satisfied because every f t  depends continuously on a i , . . . ,  at+\. 
The definition of the product topology implies therefore that /  is continuous as well.
It is conjectured that the first three conditions make sure iteratively that the 
mapping /  is inward. Combined with the forth condition, by the Halpern-Bergman 
Theorem (Halpern and Bergman, 1968, Lemma 3.1), the map /  has a fixed point. 
This fixed point is a linear rational expectations equilibrium.
One can think about the uncertainty at time t as defining a kind of potential 
for a possible effort exertion over time. In the original model in Holmstrom (1999) 
this potential is used fully over time at a rate that is determined by the speed of 
learning and by the horizon of the agent’s optimisation. Introducing shocks to the 
true talent allowed to nurture the uncertainty and therefore inhibits the depletion of 
this potential.
In a model with additional heterogeneity like Koszegi and Li (2008) or mine, the 
fact that there is a new parameter that impacts the effort level does not change the 
notion of potential or the fact that at some t high enough, it must be that at = 0. 
Here I showed that the effort level as well decreases steadily over time. However, since 
this new parameter influences the current effort level and is influenced by past and 
future effort levels, we observe a more complex path of effort exertion. The interplay 
between backward attribution and forward attribution becomes a new dimension in 
the dynamic characteristic of the model.
3.3.4 B o o tstrap p in g
In order to fill figure 3.2 with life, we can get the first intuition about the dynamics by 
considering the special case of certainty with respect to the agent’s talent. For this,
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consider the equation that illustrates the two attribution effects
d w t + i    of of  _ dE(k\yt) ,  ^ dE(k\yt)
r \  2 I 2 2 I 2^^ O ^t+1 r \oyt of +  of  of + of dyt oyt
backward attribution forward attribution
If the type is fully known, then ^ is zero, and the only motivation for exerting 
effort is to get a high talent estimation from the part of the principal. This refers back 
to the original Holmstrom-model, as reflected on the left edge of the graph.
On the other hand, if the talent is fully known and o f = 0, then the two first 
expressions are zero, and only the forward attribution might give an incentive to exert 
effort if the type is unknown to the principal. In this case, the implicit equation in 
3.6 results in the relationship between a* and at+i of
2 aeOLt H— 2 ~
<*t =
P roposition  11 I f  o f — 0 and 4of < o f there exists a range
act £
for which at > a t + i . e. the current effort level is higher than the next period’s effort 
level due to the forward attribution.
This is what Koszegi and Li (2008) refer to as “bootstrapping” of the incentives, 
since the mere signalling of drive in the next period allows the current periods effort 
to be even higher. It therefore propagates backward in time. The interval, however, 
depends on the information available on the type and the output error. The condition 
4o f < o f  implies that the output observation has to be precise enough to allow for a 
meaningful update on the type. As the information increases over time, the variance 
o f  decreases, reducing the channel for the bootstrapping and the difference between 
at and at+1- If the initiating implicit incentive is too far in the future, the channel 
might vanish completely, resulting in insignificant effort levels.
To finish this consideration the question regarding the initiating incentive has to 
be posed. If the talent is fully revealed (of = 0) the only possible incentive is the 
forward attribution that signals a high responsiveness to incentives. By the finiteness 
of the horizon and the knowledge that at some point a  =  0 irrespective of the type, 
the forward attribution cannot sustain a positive level of effort by itself. Hence, it is 
interesting to see that there is a way to have incentives propagate backwards in time
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through this forward attribution, but it is as well clear that they themselves cannot 
represent a starting point for such a propagation.
However, in a richer setting with information asymmetries between principals it 
might be conceivable that at a point in time there will be a “true” implicit incentive 
from talent uncertainty due to, say, a job change, which then allows for the backward 
propagation. A single stochastic shock in form of a change in the job description or 
in the environment might also be a realistic situation that could be at the root of a 
forward propagation. Of course, one could incorporate explicit incentives and would 
find that a forward attribution takes place.
In this model, there is no such starting point in the future, leaving a = 0 when 
c/q =  0 as depicted at the bottom edge of the graph in figure 3.2.
3.3.5 A ttr ib u tio n  dynam ics
So far, I discussed the two regions along the axes of figure 3.2. In the following the 
most important part of the graph, the updating process with twofold uncertainty, 
will be analysed and the effort dynamics be put into relation with the model under 
certainty.
The path of effort exertion, which I suggest to be the virtual third dimension in the 
graph, is changed depending on whether the backward attribution is higher or lower 
than the forward attribution. For example, in the two-period model of Proposition 1 
on page 89, the always negative backward attribution and the -  due to the end of the 
game -  non-existing forward attribution resulted in a strictly lower effort level for all 
types of agents. This illustrates that both the intertemporal effort allocation as well 
as the total effort exertion can ultimately be influenced by the timing of the updating 
of information.
Comparing the path of effort exertion in the model presented here and in the 
original model by Holmstrom (1999)61, equation 3.6 shows that the sum of forward 
and backward attribution determines whether the effort in period t is higher than in 
the model without heterogeneity. Let a  denote effort levels under the same conditions 
in the original career concerns model.
P roposition  12 The level of effort is higher in the model with heterogeneity (at > at)
a2if forward attribution is higher than backward attribution (at+i > at a‘i + a 2 ) and vice 
versa.
Proof. Follows immediately from equation 3.6. ■
Since at+i < at, the forward attribution diminishes continuously and goes to 0 
over time. This fact leads to the conclusion that in the beginning of the career it is 
more likely to see an increased effort level due to signalling in another dimension than 
talent. This is in line with the intuition that Koszegi and Li (2008) develop in their
fil <T2I compare to the equivalent with a one-period horizon, where a t =  a * $ .
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three-period model, where the first period exhibits a higher forward attribution than 
backward attribution while the second period naturally exhibits a forward attribution 
of 0.
Proposition 13 While the change over time in <Jq is independent of the effort level, 
the updating process on the type reflected by o \ is accelerated for higher effort levels.
2 2
Proof. The variance of talent a# = 1S independent of at. The next period
variance decreases with a*,
d o \  2 a t (<7%)2 (<7% +  <7e)
d a t crj +  a t a k +  a i
■
Whether this last fact leads immediately to a lower effort exertion in the period 
after the forward attribution has been higher and has led to a higher effort level 
depends on the resulting changes of a*. It cannot be ruled out yet, that the effort 
level increases when more type information is available.
Proposition 14 An increase in information on talent cannot lead to an increase in 
effort.
Proof. Using the Implicit Function Theorem on F{at,Go) = — at (see
equation 3.8) results in ^  < 0. Furthermore, > 0 if > at(at+1 — at), which
6 k  d F
is always the case since we proved that at > at+i. Therefore, > 0. ■
Proposition 15 An increase in information on type leads to an increase in effort 
exertion only if backward attribution is higher than forward attribution.
d F
Proof. Using the Implicit Function Theorem again we get =  -ff*- > 0 if at+i >
a2at 2 1 the condition from proposition 12. ■
The intuition behind this result is that ^  is higher for higher <j|, impacting 
the effort level positively only if the coefficient is positive. An increase in information 
affects the effort level positively if the backward attribution is higher than the forward 
attribution, so that the additional information on talent keeps the principal from 
attributing past performance to a too high extent to a high effort level.
3.3.6 Dynamics
In the following I will use the insights gathered so far in order to present a relatively 
complete picture of the dynamics of the effort level in a multi-period setting.
A starting point is the fact that the speed of updating for the talent is independent 
of the effort level. Therefore, the normal Holmstrom result, just with a one-period
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horizon, will represent the basis of the present model. Deviations from this will result 
from the interplay of forward and backward attribution. Those two effects are depend­
ing on both past and future effort levels since the updating of the type is depending 
on the effort level and the forward attribution is a function of future effort and hence 
future uncertainty. This future uncertainty is itself again impacted by the current 
effort level and so on.
Whether the effort level is above or beneath the standard result depends on the 
magnitude of the two attributions. By proposition 15 the dynamics in comparison 
with the standard model also depend on the same conditions. While proposition 14 
says that the information gain from one period to another always leads to a lower effort 
exertion for talent signalling reasons, this effort reduction is accelerated if the effort 
level decreases as well with the gain in information on type. Therefore, for higher than 
standard effort levels there is a tendency to relatively faster effort decrease, while for 
lower than standard effort levels the reduction in effort due to information gain is 
mitigated due to the gain in information on type and its effort increasing effect.
In addition to this, proposition 13 allows to say that the mitigation from type 
updating is the higher the higher the effort levels are since the amount of information 
gained from one period to the other is increasing in the absolute level of effort. With 
the knowledge that in the second last period the effort level in the model with het­
erogeneity has to be lower than the standard model, the following picture gives a first 
idea of the implied dynamics.
 Additional heterogeneity
 Holmstrom (1999)
-> Periods
it -1- 1 t + 2 tH-3 £ +  4 t-(-5 £~1“ 6t
F igure  3.3: The effort dynamics with and without type uncertainty.
Qualitatively, this fits the results found by Koszegi and Li (2008) for the three- 
period model which could be represented graphically as follows:
3 HETEROGENEOUS CAREER CONCERNS 106
 Koszegi and Li (2008)
 Holmstrom (1999)
Periods
2 31
Figure 3.4: The effort dynamics in a three-period model.
However, it is not clear that initially the forward attribution needs to be larger
than the backward attribution. Note that the condition for this is strictest when the
2
uncertainty about the talent is highest ( a ^ a 2 )■> i- e. in the very beginning. Therefore, 
it is also conceivable to obtain the following effort dynamics.
 Additional heterogeneity
 Holmstrom (1999)
♦ Periods
£4-1 £ + 2 £4-3 £4-4 £ +  5 £ + 6£
Figure 3.5: Possible effort dynamics with and without type uncertainty.
Obviously, the scope for a higher forward attribution depends on the planning 
horizon of the agent. In my model, for computational purposes I restricted myself to 
a one-period planning horizon which gives rise to rather restrictive conditions. With 
a longer horizon, like the two-period horizon in Koszegi and Li (2008), the forward 
attribution obtains a higher weight, making the process depicted in figure 3.3 more 
likely. At the same time, the horizon consideration points towards the relevance of not 
only the higher career concerns as considered so far, but also towards the necessity of 
planning ahead long enough.
Finally, the condition on the relative size of the two effects dictates that there is 
no oscillation around the standard effort level. Without being able to prove it, in my 
opinion it is also true that the effort pathways cross one time at most.
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3.3.7 Interpretation and extensions
The results of my model show a congruence with the intuition that was developed 
by Koszegi and Li (2008). While the analysis of the two-period model indicates the 
relevance of an incentive muting due to additional heterogeneity, in the longer horizon 
model both an increased effort in the beginning and constantly lower effort exertion 
can occur depending on the parameters.
This indicates that it is not necessarily true that the beginning of a career is 
also connected with a higher effort due to type signalling. We can observe that the 
signalling of the type can be a hinderance for effort exertion in the situation where 
agents are afraid that the past talent evaluation is in jeopardy when they display too 
large career concerns.
The possibility of an increase in effort thanks to a noisy signal of effort hinges on 
the fact that the forward attribution is higher than the backward attribution. Letting 
the principal receive a noisy signal on effort implies that the relevance of this observed 
period’s effort is increased and the updating accelerated. However, this measure will 
exhibit an adverse effect if it is done in situations of higher backward attribution. 
Here, effort would be muted even more and the increased precision in the inferred 
talent and type leads to a reduction of effort for all remaining periods.
Of course, this statement needs to be qualified and revisited when it becomes 
feasible to examine a longer period game with a planning horizon of the agent that is 
larger than just the one period I assumed here. This qualifier seems to point towards 
the question as to whether the horizon in the planning can also be considered to 
be part of a certain heterogeneity, since career concerns are obviously all about the 
planning horizon and future payoffs.
3.4 C onclusion
In this chapter I presented an analysis of additional heterogeneity in the career con­
cerns model. Starting out with the general consideration of heterogeneity in the 
framework of a two-period career concern model the effect of backward attribution 
was introduced and found to be a constant feature of any incentive structure under 
additional heterogeneity. While this effect’s direction could also be determined to be 
effort reducing, the analysis of the infinite-period model is not as straightforward.
In the multi-period model the analysis hinges on the interplay between backward 
attribution and forward attribution, a second effect that results from the incentive 
to signal high career concerns. Since the interplay is relative intricate, the analy­
sis is confined to point out the main qualitative features of the effort dynamics. In 
particular, it cannot be ruled out that the additional heterogeneity does mute incen­
tives throughout the duration of the game. However, there is also the possibility of 
a dynamic pathway that is similar to the one found in Koszegi and Li (2008). Here 
incentives are increased in the beginning of the career and muted in the end. This
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indicates that measures like additional noisy signals on effort work only under certain 
circumstances in the desired direction.
A main take-away point should be the strong possibility of a non-monotonicity of 
effort levels in uncertainty. While the original model of Holmstrom (1999) highlights 
the purpose of uncertainty for achieving an efficient effort level, the present analysis 
shows that uncertainty about other dimensions of relevant type characteristics of the 
agent might work against this, reducing effort levels under increased uncertainty.
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C A p p en d ix
C .l  P ro o f o f proposition  w ith  m ore th a n  2 types
Proof. (Proposition 1 with N  types) Analogously to equation 3.2 the objective func­
tion with N  types becomes
kN
f(y\a) dy -  c(a). (3.9)
By the MLRP arguments we can state the relationships between talent inferences as
E(0\y, a0*) > E(0\y, a1*) > . >  E(0\y, aN t).
Since J2k=k° Pr{k\y) =  1 it follows that J2k=k° V) =  ® and -§jPr(k =
*°l v) = - z £ k i  J^Pr(k\y). We analyse the change in the integrand that comes from 
a change in output, which is a direct consequence of a marginal increase in effort. 
The expression in square brackets is
kN
Y ,P r { k \y ) - E { 8 \y,ak*)
fc=fcO
and its derivative with respect to y becomes 
kN kN
Y ,  £ -Pr(k\y)-E(0\y,ak* ) + Y  Pr(k\y) ■ A E (0\y ,ak*).
k=k° k=k°
Using the mentioned results this can be rewritten as
■jj^Pr(k = k°\y) i & ,  % p r m - m v , < n
k
£;Pr(k\y)dy
The very last expression is the one known from the standard model, where the 
higher output level positively impacts the expectation of the talent. The expressions 
before result from the association of the output to different types of agents.
The sign of this additional expressions can be found by observing that the first 
expression -§^Pr(k = k°\y) < 0 as a higher output decreases the probability that the 
agent is the one with lowest career concerns.
Because the fraction inside the brackets is necessarily greater than E(9\y, a1*) > 
E(0\y, a0*), the expression in the brackets is negative. Therefore, as in the case of two 
types, it follows that the marginal incentives are muted for all types as well. ■
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C.2 P ro o f of P roposition  3
To calculate the different required conditional expectations, we need to consider a 
multi-variate normal distribution that consists of the ‘talent’ and ‘type’ variables that 
are updated over time and the observables yt and yt+\ that are used for the updating.
E
( \
Var
( \
6  +  ott • k +  £t
y 6  +  at+i • k +  £t+1 J
e
k
0  + at - k + et
y 9 +  at+1 • k +  £t+1 J
0
& t' f^ k
y <*t+1 • Ph
(  cr2e o
o
a t° i
CLto \ 
ae +  u\  +  ae
Oit+l&l 
a 2e +  a ta t+ia 2k
y  a% at+ivt: (T% +  a ta t+ia% +  af+1a% +  o
The conditional of a multivariate normal distribution of the form
£21 ^22
is given by the following expression
Xi\x2 ~  N  +  ^ 2 1 ^ 2 2 ( ^ 2  ~~ ^ 2)? ^11 — -^'21^ 221^ '2l) •
The following four expressions for expected value and variance obtain.
E(k\yt) = fik + a tak{ad + aja% + a£) (yt - a tfik)
=  ^ + ^  +  “ p 2 + g | f a - ^ )
Var(k\yt) =  a2k =  <x| -  2 2 < <d (3.10)
/ T "  1 r \ l "  / T  “  I / T  ^i fc
+ al
to
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E(0\k,yt) = 0 + ( 0  a2 )  I a
V '  \ 0 L t (
= ( <*% ■ h i  V0I22 ) ^
k a ta l  \  (  k - E ( k \ y t)
2 J 2 , „2 Jl , _2+  ° l  J \ V t -  a tE(k\yt)
k - E ( k \ y t) \  
a tE(k\yt) )
crl
a i + cr (yt -  a tE(k\yt))
Note that k — E(k\yt) =  0 since at that point in time, there is no perceivable difference 
between the two since k is not observed as opposed to yt-
alcr2
Var(0\k,yt) = cr2e = ^ < a0 (3‘12)
<7e + ae
With these expressions the wage in the next period is
Wt+^  =  ~2 o (Vt ~  a tE(k\yt)) + a t+iE(k\yt) 
ao + ° i
T T o f ‘ +  ( “ t+1 “ 3 +3 “*) m v t ) ■
Deriving with respect to yt proves the proposition.
A similar derivation can be done for the subsequent period t + 1 , in order to get 
an idea as to what the next effort parameter a*+i looks like.
wt+2 =  E(yt+i\yt, yt+i) = E (6 \yt, yt+1) +  a t+2 E(k\yt, yt+1)
dw t + 2  
" t+1 "  dy t + 1
_  a2e (at (at -  a t+i)al + a2)
(a2 +  a2a2 +  a2)(a2 +  a2t+1a2 +  a2) -  (a2 +  a tat+ia 2)2 
a t+i&0 -  (*t+i)°l +  or2) [at+i(J2k(<T2e +  a 2to \  +  <71) -  at°\(cj\ +  a tat+i(T2k)\
((a% +  a 2a2 + a2)(o\ + a 2+1a l  +  a2) -  (o2e +  a ta t+ia2)2)2
. n, a t+KTl(<70 +  (*W k +  o p  ~  a tvk (c r2e +  a t a t + i a 2k)
+ t+2(a2 +  a 2 a 2 + a 2 )(a2 + a 2t+1a 2 + a2) -  (a2 +  a ta t+ia 2 ) 2
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